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l. Abstract 
Although many Norwegian companies have the Lean Culture with success but a large 
number has failed when attempting this goal. As companies try to implement and apply Lean 
in response to competitive pressures, they often become one-dimensional in their 
approach. As the main purpose, this document seeks to study and analyse the 
underlying reasons surrounding companies' failures in their Lean initiatives and how to 
implement them in a successful and sustainable way. This document is based on a thorough 
literature research concerning the success and failure of Lean implementations, enriched 
through an assortment of individual interviews with Lean experts, acting as a precursor for 
the development of a novel roadmap as a practical guide to open up a window of 
opportunity for managers, who want to become Lean in an effective and sustainable way. 
Lean implementation, Manufacturing systems, Failure reasons, Critical success factors, 
Strategic management ofLean 
3 
2. Introduetion 
"Hundreds of thousands of executives from thousands of businesses worldwide have toured 
Toyota's plants in Japan and the United States but none have been able to replicate Toyota's 
performance" Spear & Bowen (1999: 97). This is indeed astrong statement. 
As competition increases in all branches ofboth the manufacturing and the service industries 
most organizations agree that it is imperative to optimize all their proeesses if one wants to 
survive and thrive, not only in times of inerease when markets are booming but, during 
periods of recession as well. 
The Toyota Production System has since the 1980's been recognized as the optimal 
manufacturing system by industry worldwide. The interest for lean manufacturing has, since 
then, been increasing by leaps and bounds. Many companies, throughout the world, greatly 
impressed and in some cases stunned by Toyota's success have pursued ways to optimize 
proeesses and make products more efficiently. They have tri ed very hard to implement 
Toyota's methods and imitate Toyota's success without, the most ofthem, making any 
appreciable headway. 
Toyota has been extremely open and willing to share its philosophy, methodology and tools 
with anyone who so wished, even with major competitors like Chrysler, Ford and GM, none 
however have been able to duplicate Toyota's success. Some organizations have come close 
others nowhere near. 
Executives visiting Toyota are usually impressed by the various tools and other visible 
practices such as Just-in Time, Kanban, SS, Quality Circles etc. and identify these as the key 
elements ofTPS or Lean. Strangely enough although these tools and methods have the power 
and ability to greatly improve manufacturing and operational performance they have not been 
effective in the successful and sustainable implementation ofTPS. 
The excuses are many. The most commonly used excuse, or should one say alibi, when 
implementation grinds to a screeching halt is that Japanese culture is so different from 
western culture. But as stated by Spear and Bowen (1999) this is just not the case. 
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"Other Japanese companies such as Nissan and Honda have fallen short of Toyota's 
standards, and Toyota has successfully introduced TPS all around the world including in 
North America" Spear and Bowen (1999: 97) 
This does not however mean that culture does not play a role in the implementation. Y ou do 
not have to be Japanese to implement lean but cultural differences do offer challenges. 
The goal of this thesis is to investigate the reasons for this failure and give the reader an 
indication as to what factors or criteria facilitate or inhibit the successful implementation of 
lean manufacturing. The thesis does not discuss the advantages of Lean manufacturing. This 
has been established beyond any reasonable doubt by numerous other authors. 
The research commenced with a thorough review ofliterature. The review pin-pointed three 
critical criteria that had to be met before a company could attain the successful and 
sustainable implementation of lean. Some of the traps one should avoid so as not to be misled 
into thinking one is successfully implementing lean, when in reality one is only scratching the 
surface and in many instances doing more harm than good, will also be addressed. 
To investigate the validity of the three criteria thus uncovered a survey consisting of a twenty 
point questionnaire and a series of interviews was conducted. The survey is more closely 
described in the methodology chapter. Chapter three describes the literature review. This 
chapter also provides an insight into the Toyota Training program TWI. It is important that 
the reader understands the importance Toyota places on developing their people. Theyadhere 
to the Chinese proverb; 
"lf you want one year of prosperity grow seeds 
lfyou want ten year ofprosperity grow trees 
If you want hundred years of prosperity grow people" 
Liker & Meier (2007: 3) 
Chapter four describes the philosophical assumptions as to knowledge, data gathering and 
analysis. The ontology platform for this thesis is relativist and the epistemology platform is 
constructionism which corresponds closely to the research methodology based on a survey. 
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Based on this platfonn the methodology chosen was a survey. Chapter five describes the 
methodology, the survey, the questionnaire and the results obtained from the twenty returned 
questionnaires and the analysis. 
A briefhistory ofmanufacturing is described in chapter six with a couple ofparagraphs being 
dedicated to the description of craft production. The chapter goes on to describe the birth of 
mass production before rounding off with a description on how the tenn "Lean" originated. 
Chapter seven describes mass production thinking. This is important because it is later 
compared to lean thinking to give the reader a picture ofthe differences between the two 
manufacturing philosophies. Toyota to ok most ofits ideas from Ford and the USA. The 
reader can, as he/she progresses through the chapters ofthis thesis, clearly understand how 
Toyota adapted the basic principles ofmass production, American sup enn arkets (origin of 
JIT) and Ford's assembly line and tumed these techniques into the world's most effective 
production system. 
Chapter eight presents the history of Toyota from the very beginning, giving the reader a 
picture of the character ofthe founding fathers of Toyota and their moral fiber. One gets a far 
greater understanding ofhow and why Toyota managed to write this incredible success story. 
It is the story about a set of leaders with the highest possible morais, experts their business 
and with the necessary guts and gumption to reach the very top and stay there. Maybe it is 
here the myth that the success ofTPS is dependent on Japanese culture started. High morais, 
hard work, honor and respect for people are not exclusive to Japan. 
The philosophy of Toyota which resulted in Toyota's culture - "The Toyota Way" is 
described in chapter nine where the fourteen principles are explained briefly. A thorough 
understanding ofthese fourteen principles is a great starting point for any company seriously 
contemplating the implementation of lean manufacturing. This will be a great guideline for 
setting up one's own philosophy. 
Chapter ten describes the two pillars, JIT and Jidoka, ofthe Toyota Production System (TPS) 
and the relationship between them. The TPS house illustrates the important elements within 
the system. 
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The problem has always been that companies outside of Toyota have tried to implement 
stand-alone tools or parts of systems and elements taken out of context. It would be worth 
noting what Fujio Cho once said: 
"The key to the Toyota Way and what makes Toyota stand out is not any o/the 
individual elements, but what is important is having all the elements together 
as a system. I must be practiced every day in a very consistent manner - not in 
parts" Liker (2004: xv) 
Chapter eleven describes the foundations of the TPS house. Leveled production, Kanban, 
Stable and standardized proeesses, the four roles, waste and visual management are all 
described in some detail. 
Chapter twelve touches on Toyota's attitude towards leadership and what is expected of a 
Toyota leader 
Chapter thirteen diseusses why companies do not have any appreciable success implementing 
lean and focuses on the major trap many companies should avoid when initiating a transition 
to lean, i.e. focusing on implementing stand-alone tools cherry picked from the lean tool box. 
This chapter specially illustrates the fallacy of starting with 5S. 
Chapter fourteen offers some important criteria that have to be met to lay the foundation for a 
successful transition to lean manufacturing. 
Chapter fourteen touches on some requirements to succeed while chapter fifteen concludes 
the thesis with a brief road map for success, possible limitations and a suggestion for further 
research. 
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3. Literature review 
Any cursory glanee at manufacturing management literature in general and lean 
manufacturing in particular, reveals the existence of a large body of literature spanning the 
length and breadth of the subject matter. Books and articles on lean manufacturing have been 
written by hundreds of authors and describe every conceivable aspect of Lean Manufacturing. 
Naturally, there has been considerable attention paid to factors affecting the implementation 
of lean manufacturing; which is the core of this dissertation. 
Early western literature was mostly dedicated to describing bits and pieces of TPS taken out 
of context or describing the tools, and systems ofTPS. The authors did not connect these tools 
and methods to the overall philosophy. They were described as stand-alone methods, miracle 
cures for success. This led to the creation of some myths about TPS. 
As Jeffrey K. Liker states the main myths created were that TPS was a tangible recipe for 
success, a management project or program, aset oftools, a system for the shop floor only, can 
be implemented in a short to mid-term period. Liker (2004) 
One of the earliest pieces of literature published in the west was the English translation of the 
book "The Toyota Production System - Beyond Large Scale Production" authored by the 
father ofthe TPS, Taiichi Ohno. He introduced the world to the Toyota Production System, its 
development and management. It was a new method of manufacturing that would minimize 
costs and increase profits. This was mainly accomplished by learning to recognize and 
eliminate waste. 
"The most important objective of The Toyota system has be en to increase production 
efficiency by consistently and thoroughly eliminating waste" Ohno (1988: xiii) 
Or as Ohno so succinctly put it 
"All we are doing is looking at the time line. From the moment the customer gives us 
an order to the point when we collect the cash, and we are reducing that time line by 
removing the non-value added wastes" Ohno (1988: ix) 
8 
Ohno's book describes the foundation and pillars that support the "Toyota House", team work 
and the radically new thought proeess that is necessary to succeed. There is however one 
critical condition that Ohno explicitly and categorically states is necessary. 
Ohno emphasizes the critical importance of top management commitment and support, for 
example in the implementation of Kanban. Kanban is considered to be an important part of 
the foundation of the "TPS house", i.e. the Toyota Production System house. Ohno states that 
Top management commitment is critical when implementing and practicing the first rule of 
kanban, which is that the later proeess goes to the earlier proeess to pick up needed products. 
"To practice this first rule a superficial understanding is not enough. Top management 
must change its way of thinking and make a commitment to reverse the conventional 
flow of production transfer and delivery. This will meet lots of resistance and requires 
courage. The greater the commitment however the more successful will be the 
implementation ofthe Toyota Production System". Ohno (1988: 30) 
Ohno repeatedly emphasizes the importance oftop management commitment and support. 
"I have a good reason for emphasizing the role of top management in discussing the 
first rule ofkanban. There are many obstacles to implementing the rule that the later 
proeess must take what it requires from the earlier proeess when it is needed. For this 
reason management commitment and strong support are essential to the successful 
application ofthis first rule" Ohno (1988: 31). 
The implication is unmistakable. Top management commitment and support are imperative 
for the successful implementation ofTPS. 
It must be said however that Ohno did not propagate a definite strategy for the 
implementation ofTPS. That was not his intention when writing his book. The book was 
originally written in 1978 in Japanese and whatever his motives were, one can safely assurne, 
it was not written to teach westemers the philosophy or the systems ofTPS. 
Ohno describes some ofthe systems that make up TPS specifically Just in time, Jidoka, 
Kanban, continuous improvement and standardized work. These are the pillars and part of the 
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foundation ofTPS. He also emphasizes respect for people by describing the value ofteams 
and people working together in a coordinated fashion to produce value and to improve 
processes. 
Soon after the publication of Ohno's book, other researchers began to examine his methods. 
The Lean c1assic "The Machine that changed the world" by Womack Jones and Roos first 
published in 1990 unraveled some of the mysteries of Toyota's success and unleashed Lean 
manufacturing on the western world. The book is a product of the International Motor Vehicle 
Program (IMVP) which was bom at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). 
The book describes in very clear terms two fundamentally different philosophies about how 
people should go about creating value. On the one hand it describes Ford's mass production 
philosophy which became the production system of the industrialized world while on the 
other hand the book describes the philosophy and management system which was developed 
by Toyota in the twenty odd years after WW2, The Toyota Production System. 
Womack et al. (1990) states three obstacles that stand in the path of a generallean industrial 
world. The book was first written in 1990 and describes some history, then moves on to 
certain elements of Lean Manufacturing but does not initially give any tangible suggestions as 
to how to implement Lean. However there is an afterword written in 2007 where the authors 
describe what they have leamed since they published the book in 1990. From an 
implementation point ofview the afterword is of greater interest. Here the authors discuss 
what they missed first time around and what they would inc1ude if they were writing "The 
Machine" in 2007. 
In 1990 the authors focused on problem solving by work teams and job rotation among 
professionals but the role of the Line Managers in production, design and sales was hardly 
mentioned. Womack et al. (1990) In 2007 after almost twenty years oflearning one can say in 
hindsight that although the problem sol ving work teams, which they focused on in 1990, are 
very useful in any organization, the work processes these teams improve have to be first 
standardized by the managers and industrial engineers if the teams are to have any hope of 
improving them at all. As Ohno said, "Without standards there can be no Kaizen". Womack et 
al. (2007) 
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The authors by their own admission missed out on the very important role played by 
management. 
"We realized that problem solving by managers is a much larger fraction oftheir job 
than we had realized" Womack et al. (2007: 291). 
During their studies of the Toyota Production System from 1990 to 2007 the authors of "The 
Machine" discovered that management involvement and support was imperative to TPS. It 
was the managers that were trained to identify problems and improve the processes in their 
areas of management. This included leading the improvement process, deve10ping 
imp1ementation plans, measuring results and adjusting the process. Basically this is the Plan -
Do - Check - Action system that Toyota 1earned from Edward Deming. Toyota to ok this one 
step further and deve10ped the now famous A3 ana1ysis too1 which is a prominent 
management tool at Toyota. Womack et al. (2007) 
This is very much in keeping with what Ohno states from the very beginning. That 
management commitment is imperative. 
Then in 2004 Jeffrey K. Liker published his book "The Toyota Way" which became an 
international best seller. In the main body of the book Liker exp1ains the fourteen 
management princip1es of the Toyota phi10sophy, what they really mean and how they work 
to optimize all processes. 
Toyota practices these princip1es far beyond its high-vo1ume assemb1y lines. For Ease of 
understanding these 14 principles have been divided into four (4) categories all starting with 
"P" - Phi10sophy, Process, Peop1e/Partners and Problem solving. (Liker -2004) The 
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Liker emphasizes that the vital ingredient necessary is management commitment. He goes 
even further to state that according to the leaders at Toyota, there must also be a cultural 
transformation with regard to continuous improvement. 
"When I first began leaming about TPS, I was enamored of the power of 
one-piece flow, kanban, and other lean tools. But along the way, experienced leaders 
within Toyota kept telling me that these tools and techniques were not the key to TPS. 
Rather the power behind TPS is a company's management commitment to 
continuously invest in Us people and promote a culture of continuous 
improvement. I nodded like I knew what they were talking about, and continued to 
study how to calculate kanban quantities and set up one-piece flow cells. After 
studying for alm ost 20 years and observing the struggles other companies have had 
applying lean, what these Toyota teachers told me is finally sinking in". 
Liker (2004:10) emphasis added 
Liker is adamant when he states that one problem that hinders successful implementation is 
that companies mistake aset oflean tools as deep "lean thinking". Companies embrace lean 
tools but do not understand the how they must work together and what makes them work 
together in a system and the cultural change necessary. 
12 
Discussing management that just adopts a few technical tools Liker states; 
"They do not understand the power behind true TPS and the continuous improvement 
culture needed to sustain the principles of the Toyota Way". Liker (2004: 12) 
Liker also describes the personalities and philosophies of the founding fathers of Toyota, the 
Toyoda family, and how they passed on their philosophy from father to son from Uncle to 
nephew. Yes one family has really formed Toyota's culture and left its indelible mark on 
Toyota. There is however another very important fact to be taken into consideration. That is 
the remarkable consistency of Leadership that Toyota has achieved. This in turn has then lead 
to a consistency of philosophy and culture throughout the history of the company. All the 
roots of the Toyota way philosophy can be traced back to the very beginning of the company 
and the founding fathers. Every Toyota Leader whether family member or not is encoded with 
the DNA ofthe Toyota way. Liker (2004) 
"The Toyota Way" like the "The Machine" confirms what Ohno stated. Management 
commitment is imperative to the success ofTPS. Liker however goes further and points out 
the necessity of organizational and cultural changes the company is dependent on to make a 
successful transition to TPS. 
Liker joined forces with another Toyota veteran, David Meyer, and in 2006 they published 
"The Toyota way Field book". While "The Toyota Way" is more of an explanatory work, 
"The Toyota Way Field Book" is a practical guide for implementing the Toyota Production 
System. Throughout the book the authors define the most common traps companies usually 
walk into while attempting to implement TPS. They also give tips as to what companies can 
do to facilitate successful implementation. The authors not only emphasize the importance of 
leadership and management commitment but explains what this means in terms of what their 
activities as mangers and leaders should be. 
"Leaders develop and mentor others to do many of the tasks often done by leaders 
within other companies". Liker & Meier (2006: 220) 
"Often companies focus on developing leadership "duties" or "responsibilities" rather 
than on expectations. This is similar to attempts to implement lean tools rather than 
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lean philosophies. People want to know "What does a leader do?" rather than "What 
are the objectives or expectations ofleadership". Liker & Meier (2006: 221) 
There is also a great deal of emphasis on hiring, training and developing people. The Toyota 
way philosophy is always centered on its people and Toyota regards its employees as its 
greatest asset. 
Toyota leaders say "We build people not cars" What they mean is that in the process of 
building cars and continuously improving the processes Toyota's employees are leaming and 
developing themselves. Liker & Meier (2006) 
The development of employees was deemed so important that Liker and Meier published 
"Toyota Talent" in 2007. This book is all about how you can develop talented people to 
achieve great results. The principle of developing people is so important to the philosophy of 
Toyota that six of the fourteen principles described in the Toyota Way are related to it 
Principle 1: Base management decisions on a long-term philosophy even at the expense of 
short termfinancial goals: The most important long-term investment Toyota makes is in 
its people and the passion to keep team associates employed for their careers reflects that 
value. Liker & Meier (2007: 6) 
Principle 6: Standardized processes are the foundation for continuous improvement: 
Standardized work and job instruction training go hand in hand, and long term associates 
need to leam to see waste and make improvements. Liker & Meier (2007: 6) 
Principle 9: Grow leaders vvho thoroughly understand the work and who live the 
philosophy and teach it to others: Teaching is the most highly valued skill ofleaders, and 
leaders have to deeply understand the work to teach and coach others. Liker & Meier 
(2007: 7) 
Principle 10: Develop exceptional people and teams who follow your company's 
philosophy: Teams dep end on well-trained people, and part of individual development is 
leaming to work in teams. Liker & Meier (2007: 6) 
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Principle 11: Respect your suppliers by challenging them and helping them improve: 
Suppliers need to have the same talent level as Toyota team associates and are developed 
in similar ways. Liker & Meier (2007: 6) 
Principle 14: Become a learning organization through relentless reflection and 
continuous improvement. This was intentionally at the top hierarchy of the Toyota 
pyramid because becoming a leaming organization is viewed as the highest level of 
organizational effectiveness. Liker & Meier (2007: 6) 
According to Toyota the central part of any manager's job is teaching. Toyota is convinced 
that if people are not adequately trained and developed the entire system will come to a 
screeching stop. At the very heart of TPS lie its people and their development. It is not just lip 
service when Toyota c1aims that its people are its greatest asset. As Liker states 
"Within many parts of Toyota TPS is referred to as the "Thinking Production System". 
When Taiichi Ohno start ed connecting operations to eliminate the waste in and 
between the operations, he made a startling discovery. When processes are connected 
problems become immediately visible and people have to think or the processes shut 
down". Liker & Meier (2006: 21). 
Only people can think and solve problems. This is why Toyota considers the development of 
their employees as critical. TPS stands or falls on this even if everything else is in place. AT 
the core of this development is a trained and committed leadership where leaders and 
managers are the teachers (sensei). Theyensure that Toyota is a leaming organization where 
improvements are carried out using a scientific method. 
The culture at Toyota is the heart and soul of the Toyota way. In 2008 Jeffrey Liker and 
Michael Hoseus published their book "Toyota Culture". This book discusses the human 
resources principles, hiring, training and generally Toyota's attitudes towards its employees 
and their development. 
Just as the house of the Toyota Production System is built on a foundation of Leveled 
production, stable and standardized processes, visual management and the Toyota Way 
philosophy with the pillars of Just-In-Time and Built in quality (Jidoka) holding up the roof, 
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The house of the Toyota Way is built on a foundation of Management Commitment and the 
two pillars Respect for People and Continuous Improvement holding up the roof. It is this 
house that makes it possible for the Toyota Production System to work successfully. 
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Fig.2 The "Toyota Way house". Larman & Vadde (2009) 
If one now looks at the Toyota Production System house depicted elsewhere in this thesis, one 
may look at the two houses as one house with two floors. The TPS house can be considered as 
the upper floor and the Toyota Way house as the first floor. The Toyota Production System is 
built on the Toyota Way. 
The literature studied can be categorized into six main areas; 
1. The general description of Toyota's philosophy and its development 
2. The general description ofthe Toyota culture bom of its philosophy 
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3. Description of The Toyota Production System, its development and how it is 
managed. 
4. Comparisons of Lean vs. Mass production and the advantages of lean. 
5. Respect for people, hiring, training and working together as teams. 
6. Descriptions on the use of the various tools ofTPS. 
The literature review clearly reveals that all the authors agree upon and are very emphatic that 
there are three major criteria that absolutely have to be met for the successful transition to 
TPS. These three are; 
l. A philosophy that is thoroughly understood by all 
2. Total Management Commitment -to living and teaching the philosophy and culture 
3. Culture that promotes respect for people and their continuous improvement (leaming 
organization. 
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What has not been understood by the vast majority of companies trying to make the transition 
to lean is that lean is not about a set of tools or techniques. Lean is about philosophy. It is to 
be mentioned that simply writing down Toyota's philosophy will not get you to your goal. 
One has to develop one's own philosophy. The good news is that you do not have to start 
from scratch. You can build on what you have leamed from Toyota - an excellent role model. 
The important thing is to really understand the philosophy as it is not possible to adapt 
something you do not understand. 
A great place to start would be for top management to get together and take stock ofthe 
current situation. This is also the basis of any Toyota improvement process. Establish what 
the culture of the organization is as oftoday. Establish its roots. Toyota's principle of "genchi 
gembutsu" says that you have to go see for yourselfto truly understand the actual situation in 
the organization. This is management by walking so leaders have to do some leg work. They 
have to go, see and talk to the employees, supervisors and lower level managers. One has to 
establish if the current culture of the organization matches up to the stated philosophy. There 
will be a gap. One has to then methodically close this gap as much as possible. 
"There is a gap at Toyota - we suspect smaller that most" Liker & Meier (2006: 23) 
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The 1eaders have to map their way and decide on what they want their phi10sophy to 100k like. 
They have to decide their way. The figure be10w can help to focus on all the important 
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The 1eaders have to decide on what they want to 100k like intemally and extemally. This is in 
terms ofboth peop1e and the business. In terms of business one has to estab1ish a broader 
corporate strategy. One cannot have a profitable and financially healthy organization without 
a well-deve10ped, effective strategy based on the corporate phi10sophy. The danger of not 
having a strategy is that an organization can embrace too1s like TQM, benchmarking, 
re engineering, six-sigma etc. and achieve remarkable operationa1 improvements and the too1s 
and techniques have gradually taken the p1ace of strategy. These will however never be 
sustainable continuous gains that lead to sustainable profitabi1ity. Why? because although 
operational effectiveness is necessary for superior performance is just not enough. This is 
again because the tools and techniques are very easy to imitate and everybody can easi1y gain 
the same effectiveness. The very essence of strategy is in deciding on a va1uable pattem of 
action rooted in a phi10sophy and systems of action that are very hard to imitate thus giving an 
organization its competitive edge. 
A case in point is Toyota. The to01s are easy to imitate and Toyota is very open in showing 
everybody what they do, but very few organizations have been able to copy them with any 
degree of success. 
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Most senior managers are convinced that their commitment and involvement are adequately 
demonstrated by the fact that they have agreed to and paid for the hiring of consultants to train 
the operators and that they have released one or two persons to be "Lean facilitators". Now 
they just duck back into their offices and continue to turn their attention back to do ing what 
they have always done in the same manner as they have always done. They think they are 
handling the company's important issues. "Oh Lean can be handled by the consultants and the 
facilitators. We hope we get our money's worth from these guys" is the general thought. This 
approach by senior management can be called the "Wash me but don't get me wet" approach. 
They expect everyone else to change but do not see that it is necessary for them to do so, after 
all it was their past behavior that brought them to their current position. 
What does true management commitment mean? 
The 14 principles described in Jeffrey Liker's best seller The Toyota way, form the basis of 
top leadership commitment. They are very well illustrated in the "4 P" model that Liker & 
Meier uses in his 2006 follow up, The Toyota Way Field Book. (Seefig. 1) 
To make lean work the organization has to live the philosophy. The responsibility for living 
the philosophy falls squarely on the shoulders ofleadership. 
"All executives, managers, directors, supervisors, group leaders or whatever else you 
call them have to live the philosophy every day in a very consistent manner. Leaders 
have to lead by example ...... consistently. To do this reguires a major commitment, 
starting at the very top of the company. It is not just an abstract philosophical 
commitment to support "1ean." It is a commitment to a "way." - away oflooking at 
the business purpose, of looking at proeesses, of looking at people and a way forward 
in leaming to leam as an organization" Liker & Meier (2006: 25) emphasis added. 
It is critical that mangers and leaders change their philosophy of management. First and 
foremost they have to quit the role ofbeing the boss and take on the mantle ofteacher and 
trainer (Sensei). This means that the leadership should truly leam, live and teach the 
philosophy. Allleaders and managers have to have an in depth knowledge of the work. They 
have worked on the shop floor. In addition they have to have the ability to develop, to mentor 
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to guide and to coach and lead people. This eams them respect for their knowledge and they 
are followed because of their leadership abilities. One can say that you cannot manage people. 
You manage tasks and lead people. Gary Convis, the first president of Toyota Motor 
Manufacturing Kentucky (TMMK), is cited by Liker as to what Toyota expects ofleaders 
who must go beyond the getting results and do things right in the Toyota way. 
"We believe in hands-on knowledge and not someone who comes out of college and 
becomes the boss. We look for someone who has the ability, personal drive and 
appreciation for the team members' work itself. A person who is humble and can 
respect the work others do and can use their problem solving skills as they slowly go 
up the ladder have greater influence" Liker (2004: 200) 
Convis goes on to explain that Toyota expects their leaders and managers to get their hands 
dirty on the shop floor. Toyota believes that managing cannot be done from behind a desk in 
the office. 
Although his book is mainly about TPS and the systems therein, Ohno (1978) mentions the 
importance of management in his book where he expostulates that only management skills 
acquired by training on the shop floor are of any use. 
In the west it has always been thought that the person with an MBA or a Masters in 
economics could just walk in and immediately run any business by looking at numbers and by 
using general management and leadership principles. No self-respecting Toyota manager 
would subscribe to this notion. As Liker (2004) describes the least effective type ofmanager 
is exactly the above mentioned kind. They only have general management expertise. Theyare 
the bureaucratic managers. The only way these managers manage is to make a lot of policies 
and rules and then measure performance relative to these. This takes the focus away from the 
some of the main tasks of a manager such as customer satisfaction and building a leaming 
organization. 
One has to remember that the philosophy of Toyota was established and handed down by the 
founding fathers themselves and the top leaders of Toyota were saturated with, believed in, 
lived and taught the philosophy. 
20 
Toyota has had a consistency ofleadership and leaders that is unparalleled. There have not 
been the frequent changes in top leadership that is so common in the west where large 
companies change CEO's, directors and other top leaders at the drop of a hat. At Toyota no 
one believes that a new broom sweeps better. When Gary Convis was the President of TMMK 
he was asked how long it took to teach a manager hired from outside the Toyota Corporation 
to be a Toyota manager he answered "about ten years". The challenge he explains is not about 
leaming the technical skills but leaming the right behavioral skills. (Liker 2004) 
The Toyota culture or the Toyota Way as it is also known is aresult ofits philosophy 
described in the fourteen principles. 
According to Merriam -Webster dictionary culture is defined as: 
"The set of shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices that characterizes an institution or 
organization" 
Culture is always about humans. It is the people in a society or organization who create its 
culture. The success of Toyota is dependent upon its people and the way they act and interact. 
This can be regarded as Toyota's culture and the DNA of Toyota lies in its culture. From the 
very beginning of Toyota, since they started operations the leaders at Toyota, men like 
founder Sakichi Toyoda, Kichiro Toyoda, Eiji Toyoda and Taiichi Ohno believed that the key 
to success was investing in their most valuable re source, their people. Toyota has tirelessly 
evolved its culture from the very beginning and taught the Toyota Way to all its employees. 
It is a strong beliefwithin Toyota's culture that its managers are leaders and that leaders are 
teachers. 
"The Toyota way is first and foremost about its culture - the way people think and behave 
is deeply rooted in its philosophy and its principles. At the core it is about respect for 
people and continuous improvement and this has not changed since the company's 
founding" Liker & Hoseus (2008: 4) 
The book discusses what culture is and the challenges one faces when trying to establish the 
culture of the people in the immediate environment. The culture from country to country and 
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place to place is different. When Toyota starts up a plant in a new country, they carefully 
study the local community to determine how best to develop the Toyota culture in that 
particular environment. This requires time and patience, in fact it takes years. It took about 
fifteen years at Toyota Motor Manufacturing Kentucky (TMMK) to develop the Toyota 
culture Liker & Hoseus (2008). The authors state that the DNA of Toyota lies in its culture. 
In contrast although almost all western company leaders talk about culture and c1aim that 
people are their most valuable resource the question is do they really believe it? The first to go 
when things go bad and cuts have to be made are people. Jobs and there by employees are 
made redundant. 
Most companies will, if given the opportunity, move their operations and set up shop in a low 
cost country. They find it hard to pass up the chance of paying maybe 40 kronor an hour 
instead of240. New people can be hired after a standard hiring pro cess given some kind of 
employee training and the company will be in business. Is this enough to imprint the existing 
company culture into these people? Would management even know exactly what culture they 
were trying to imprint. 
Toyota us es another definition of culture which fits in very weU with what the Toyota Way is 
all about: 
"The pattern of basic assumptions that a given gro up has invented, discovered or 
developed to cope with its problems of external adaption and internal integration, and that 
have worked well enough to be considered valid, and, therefore to be taught to new 
members as the correct way to perceive, think and feel in relation to these problems" Liker 
& Hoseus (2008: 5) 
This shows us that culture touches deep into the hearts and min ds of people in an 
organization, influencing how they perceive, think and even feel about common issues. 
Eiji Toyota led the company from the end of the 1940' s for many decades. He led it through 
its most difficult times when it was struggling to survive and into and through its most 
prosperous times growing it into a global organization. Through aU this he never wavered 
from his fundamental belief in what makes the company run. He is quoted by Liker 
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"People are the most important asset of Toyota and the determinant of the rise and fall of 
Toyota" Liker & Hoseus (2008: 12) 
Unti12001 the Toyota culture had never been documented within the company. Toyota's 
globalization and rapid growth however made it necessary to have some kind of 
documentation of the Toyota way particularly to teach the American managers. The project 
took 10 years and was led by Fujio Cho who was then the president of TMMK. After much 
debate, discussions and about twenty revisions Cho finally suggested they freeze it and call it 
"The Toyota Way 2001" 
"The Toyota Way 2001" is an internal Toyota document. The figure below representing the 
Toyota Way house does not differ from the house described in fig.2. I would like to add this 
figure because this is the original Toyota Way house as described by the Toyota Leaders in 
2001. It is important to understand that the continuous improvement that is one of the pillars 
refers to the continuous improvement of people, not processes. 
Fig. 4 The original Toyota Way house Liker & Hoseus (2008) 
Hiroyoshi Y oshiki who helped Cho in establishing TMMK is quoted here, Liker & Hoseus 
(2008), as he recalls the struggles in writing the document. 
"The creation of Toyota Way 2001 took ten years. We started working on it in 1991. It 
was the first effort to explain to American executives Toyota principles. The Japan side 
could not really help because they never tried to articulate it. We created the first rough 
draft. Mr. Cho was here and we discussed it with Mr. Cho a lot. When Mr Cho went back 
to Japan and became the president of the whole company, finally The Toyota way came 
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up. Before that we had twenty revised versions of the Toyota Way. We could not get 100 
percent agreement. We finally agreed to call it The Toyota Way 200lto acknowledge 
there is not 100 percent agreement on what The Toyota Way is and it is always changing" 
Liker & Hoseus (2008: 14) 
The document which is 13 pages long explains the Toyota Way House in fig 4. It is important 
to understand what Toyota means by respect for people. It is a very broad commitment and 
means respect for all people touched by Toyota including employees, customers, investors, 
suppliers, the local community there the plant is situated and society at large. 
I will not go into any more detail about Toyota culture. I wanted to give the readers a peek at 
the enormous importance Toyota places on its culture and people for success. Just as I have 
attempted to do with regard to Philosophy and Leadership commitment. 
Although training will fall under the culture criterion, Toyota's focus and passion for training 
is of such magnitude that I feel that this review would be incomplete without at least 
introducing the reader to a glimpse of their methodology. 
Toyota's training program is based on training its trainers who in turn train operators to 
perform each task? It is extremely interesting to note that Toyota has copied the "Training 
Within Industry" (TWI) manual developed by the Training Within Industry Service -
American Bureau of Training under the War Manpower Commission. The manual was 
developed under the leadership of c.R. Dooley the Director of Training Within Industry 
foundation and published in 1941. The success rate of the TWI program used to train 
unskilled workers in the U.S.A. is documented. The increase is for war time production 
compared to peace time production is given below. 
1. Increased production 86 percent 
2. Reduced training time 100 percent 
3. Reduced labor hours 88 percent 
4. Reduced scrap 55 percent 
5. Reduced grievances 100 percent 
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600 elient companies ofthe TWI service were monitored from 1941 to 1945, when it ceased 
operations, to obtain the above data. Graupp & Wrona (2006) 
Dooley's dream was to use the program after the war in peace time industry to put America in 
the forefront of the industrialized world. 
"We have leamed a great deal in wartime which we can and must carryover to 
peacetime in that field of industri al activity, which, for lack of a better name, is called 
"training". During the war plants needed to use training in order to supply the needs of 
the armed forces. Now, plants must use training if they are going to survive in 
competitive situations and if they are going to keep on providing jobs and wages for 
workers" Graupp & Wrona (2006 xix). 
This did not happen in the USA. While Toyota elung on to every word and implemented TWI 
as their training program, the interest for TWI was already fading in America by the end of 
1944 as orders from the military deelined. Dooley' s words were soon forgotten. 
One could say that Toyota had this wonderful knack of adapting every smart method, 
concepts and system the Americans came up with and adapting them to improve The Toyota 
Production System. 
TWI was just another of these wonderful concepts. 
TWI is based on three parts: 
1. Job instructions 
2. Job methods 
3. Job relations 
During WW 2 the TWI people developed a model for supervisors called the "Five needs 
model for good supervisors. The model describes the five essential needs that have to be 
satisfied before any supervisor can successfully fulfill his responsibilities on the job. 
The first two needs focus on the types ofknowledge while the last three focus on types of 
skill. The first two can be obtained by reading books or attending elasses but the last three can 
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only be obtained by practice and repetition. Graupp & Wrona (2006) All Toyota's trainers are 
trained in the TWI methodology. 
The trainers have pocket cards with the most important points of each of the three stages, job 
instructions, job methods and job relations. These act as a set of instructions describing points 
to remember for each stage. Each stage has four major points. An example ofthe job 
instruction pocket card both front and back is given below. 
Fig.5 and fig.6 show the front and back of the job instruction pocket cared that each qualified 
trainer carries. 
"'ront of the TWI Job lnstructions Pocket Card 
How to Get Ready to Instruct 
Have a time table 
How much skill do you expect which workers to have - by what dates? 
Break down the job into concise Instructor Notes 
List the major steps (what to do) 
• The important steps that advance the work 
• Small enough to chew and swallow in one bite 
• Ideally with roughly similar amount of work in each step 
• Start each major step with an action verb 
Pick out the key points (bow to do it) 
• Safety factors are always a key point 
• Things that make or break the success or failure of the job 
• Tricks of the trade tbat make the job easier to do 
• If more than 5 key points, consider breaking into separate major step 
Swnmarize the reasons for key points (wby) 
Have everything ready 
• The right equipment, materials, supplies, and instruetion aids 
• Ensure that all proeess documentation is up to date to accurately reflect current best practices 
• Ensure that the worker has pemIanent and easy access to proeess documentation and training materials 
• Have the work place properly arranged 
• Just as the worker will be expected to keep it 
Fig.5. Front o/job instruction pocket card. TWI Service War Manpower Commission (1943) 
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Back of the Job Instructlons Pocket Card 
llow to Instruct 
Step 1 - Prepare tbe worker 
• Put the person at ease 
• Slale lhe job 
• Find out what the person already knows about the job 
• Get the person interested in leaming the job 
• Place the person in the eorreet position 
Step 2 - Present tbe operation 
• Ten, show, and illustmte each major step - Olle at a tim~ 
• Stress each key point, and reasons for each key point 
• \Vritten proeess documentation should be introduced only AFTER demonstration. 
• lnstruct c1earJy, completely, and patiently 
• ·leaeh no faster than the leamer can master 
Step 3 - Try out performance 
• Have lhl' k<Uller do the job - witlI the instrUl:tor allowing the kanter to work in silenct.', but corred any errors inunedialdy and perlrnps 
again demonstrate anything that wasn't fully leamed 
• Have the leamer do it again - this time explaining each important step 
• Have the Ie.amer do it again - tbis time explaining every key point 
• Have the leamer do it again - this time cxplaining the reasons tor evcry key point 
• Make sure the person understands. Continue until you kIlow they know. 
Step 4 - Follow up 
Put the person on their 0\\11 
• \lake clear how much work is expected to be done over what period oftirne 
• :\ow might be a good time tor a brief refresher on the concepts oftakt time and pitch 
Ensure that the person knows where to lind proeess documentatioll. 
Designale lo whom the person goes for help. 
Alrnos! always Iht' same supervisor tlrnl did the original trdining 
Check back frequently to see how things are going. 
Encourage questions. 
Taper off extra coaching as it become evident that the person has mastered the new skill. 
Jf tbe worker basn 't learned, tbe mstructor basn 't taught. !! 
T mining Within Illdustry \Var Manpower cornrnissioll (1943) 
Fig.6. Back of the job instruction pocket card. TWI Service War Manpower Commission (1943) 
The trainers are equipped with similar pocket card for the other two stages of the training 
program, i.e. job methods and job relations. 
The use of expert and qualified trainers using TWI ensures that Toyota has a standardized 
methodology for training its people. This in turn ensures that all team members receive 
exactly the same training in exactly the same way. The program to train the trainers takes six 
months. 
In addition to the above mentioned books, many articles, papers authored by Toyota veterans 
and a couple of master thesis have been studied. They are all emphatic about the necessity of 
a philosophy combined with management commitment and respect for people are imperative 
for the success of a sustainable implementation of lean. 
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An article, written by Eiji Toyoda, Toyoda (1985) about the roots of TPS describes 
implementing the then new concept of flow production and just in time at the Koromo 
(Honsha) factory in 1937. The introduction of flow production and just-in-time in 1937 was, 
for Toyota, an epoch making change. The key issue was how to make this new concept stick 
within the new company. Before anything else could be accomplished Eiji Toyoda says they 
had to thoroughly educate the employees, namely the supervisors and managers. To bring this 
about Eiji Toyoda says they had to essentially brainwash these people accustomed to the old 
st yle of production. Toyoda (1985) 
Here Eiji Toyoda again nails down the importance of management commitment and the 
amount of effort needed to bring about a cultural change. He specifically states that they had 
to brainwash, not the operators but, the managers and supervisors. 
Another illuminating paper is "Decoding the DNA of The Toyota Production System" By 
Spear and Bowen". Here too management commitment and the dedication to training and 
learning are emphasized. The leadership model is as relevant for the first level "team 1eader" 
supervisors as it is for those at the top of the organization. According to Spear and Bowen this 
is one ofthe ways that everybody at Toyota shares in the development ofits human resources 
and thereby develops a learning organization. Spear and Bowen claim that, in reality, Toyota 
is developing an organization of scientists who through scientific experimentation are 
continuously improving the processes. They state that this scientific method is so ingrained at 
Toyota that it does not promote the command and control environment one might expect in a 
company with such a high degree of specification and structure. On the contrary the method 
and system actually stimulates workers and managers to engage in the kind of 
experimentation and knowledge sharing that is widely recognized as the corner stone of a true 
learning organization. Spear and Bowen (1999) 
Ana Valentinova Kovacheva in her master thesis "Challenges in Lean Implementation", 
Kovacheva (2010) also claims that, lack of company culture and senior management 
commitment are challenges that have to be overcome for successful implementation. Citing 
Kettinger and Grover (1995) as cited in Motwani (2003) Kovacheva claims that any 
significant change requires the following success factors. 
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1. Strategi c initiative oftop managers acting as leaders in defining and communicating 
the vision of change. 
2. Willingness to leam. 
3. Cultural readiness 
4. Balanced network relationships 
5. Knowledge sharing 
6. Prescribed process management and change management practices 
Kovacheva (2012: 20) 
The relevance ofthese points the three main criteria in this thesis can easily be seen. 
In addition Kovacheva writes: 
"What is ne ed ed most is that managers should essentially change their philosophy of 
management. The role ofthe manager as boss needs to be replaced by allowing responsibility 
in the lower levels of the organization". Kovacheva (2010: 21) 
I disagree with Kovacheva on one point though. She claims that the financial capability of a 
company is a critical factor in implementing lean. Kovacheva (2010) Toyota was practically 
bankrupt when they start ed with TPS and Taiichi Ohno had no money, consultants, 
presentations, post it cards or any of the fancy things modem companies seem to need to start 
any kind of improvement. Ohno just worked hard with his engineers on the shop floor and 
made it work. 
Another thesis "Critical factors of Lean Implementation in Manufacturing Environments" 
Victor Simoes (2008) shows reasons for failure categorized using a rating system from 1 - 10 
Lack of management commitment and involvement 
Lack ofvision and strategy (philosophy) 
Lack of strong leadership (management commitment) 
Lack of supportive Human resources (Culture-respect for people) 
Lack of supporting organizational culture based on substantial 
pro-active improvement. (Culture - respect for people) 
Failure to engage employees & mobilize 








Highlighted text within brackets added by author 
Once again one can easily see that the main reasons for failure can easily be tied to the fact 
one or more of the criteria stated in this thesis is lacking. 
The table below Ahrens (2006: 23) agrees with what Toyota "Gurus" like Taiichi Ohno, 
Jeffrey Liker, Michael Hoseus, David Meier, Steven Spear, Kent Bowen, Gary Convis and 
Eiji Toyoda have been stating. 
Tablel: Critical successfactors 
Bfik: TPS and æan illen 
1. Row one in the table is about strategy 
2. Row two is about culture - respect for people 
3. Row three is about strategy 
4. Row Four is about strategy 
5. Row five is about philosophy 
6. Row six is about culture - respect for people 
The papers and thesis studied also go down to the next level where the use of to01s and 
methods are discussed. This thesis does not discuss tools and methods. The hypothesis is that 
ifthe three vital criteria are met then everything else will invariably fall into place. As 
mentioned elsewhere in this thesis, TPS did not come from the to01s, the tools came from 
TPS. 
I would like to include a story that illuminates the difficulties that outsiders can have of 
deciphering Toyota's culture and thereby accessing the true secret of Toyota's success. 
30 
When the fonner President of Ford Red Polling asked Mr. Cho the President ofTMMK for a 
tour, Mr. Cho arranged a grand tour for Polling. Mr. Cho was extremely respectful ofPolling 
as he remembered the contributions Ford had made in to the early development of Toyota. 
Polling and his party were allowed to go anywhere, see whatever they wanted to and ask 
anyone any question. A hour and a half into the visit Mr. Cho asked Polling what he thought. 
Polling replied saying he did not see anything unusual. Mr. Cho then asked Polling ifhe had 
any suggestions and Polling made a few. It was very clear to Mr. Cho that Polling was very 
disappointed with the visit as he had not seen what he had expected to see. After the visit Mr. 
Cho gathered his team that had arranged the visit and told them this. Liker & Hoseus (2008) 
"We have leamed a very important lesson today. We have the same equipment and 
systems as Ford, but what Mr. Polling did not see was our competitive advantage, 
which is our people. We are successful because we have intelligent, caring, highly 
successful team members". Liker & Hoseus (2008: 8) 
I would like to emphasize that Toyota addresses all its employees as team members. 
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4. Research methodology 
1 j, 
According to the Oxford English dictionary a scientific method is defined as: "A method or 
procedure that has characterized naturaI science since the 17th century, consisting in 
systematic observation, measurement, and experiment, and the formulation, testing, and 
modification of hypotheses". 
The online dictionary http://dictionary.reference.com defines a scientific method as; 
"A method of research in which a problem is identified, relevant data gathered, a hypothesis is 
formulated from these data, and the hypothesis is empirically tested". 
The method of course depends on one's world view or ontology. Once the ontological 
perspective is established, one approaches the epistemology which is the study ofknowledge 
and justified belief. That is to say how we can establish what we really know about reality and 
how we can, in the case of social sciences, proceed to obtain knowledge about society and 
people. It is in a nutshell concerned with the nature ofknowledge. 
This in turn will influence one's choice ofmethods. (fig.7) 
This aim of this thesis is to provide a theoretical guide to understanding some key 
philosophies, concepts and methods of Lean Manufacturing and some key factors that either 
help or hinder a successful implementation of Lean manufacturing. 
There is a considerable amount ofliterature available already on this subject. The majority of 
authors like Jeffrey K. Liker in his books specially The Toyota Way and Toyota Culture, 
Taiichi Ohno in his classic book The Toyota Production System, Spear and Bowen in their 
paper Decoding the DNA of Toyota, to name a few, all argue that although manufacturing 
system analysis prior to implementation is an important criterion the total and absolute 
success of implementation is totally dependent on leaders understanding and practicing the 
philosophies, culture and principles of the company. 
The author will provide an appropriate epistemology based on its suitability for the research 
aimed at conforming or denying the arguments presented by the authors. The question is 
important because successful implementation could mean that a company can, not only be 
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successful in times of growth but also in times of no growth or recession, have the ability to 
pro sper. There is the additional factor that a botched implementation is an expensive and 
discouraging affaire where all the resources invested in the failed implementation are lost. 
When starting out on any research it is imperative that the researcher is aware ofhis/her 
research philosophy assumptions and how his/her approach to the research subject. (Falconer 
and Mackay, 1999) 
I will here clarify and discuss the ontology and epistemology and their influence on the lean 
research. 
There are several ways in which one can view the world: From a social sciences point of view 
the debate has primarily been between the positions of internal realism, relativism and 
nominalism. 
The internal realists' position is that concepts within social sciences such as racial 
discrimination or social class can be treated as real phenomena that exist independent of the 
researcher. These phenomena have real consequences for the li fe chances and careers of the 
people and although measuring them or even agreeing on what they mean can be difficult they 
do exist and have consequences. (Easterby-Smith et al.2012) 
The relativist stand is that these phenomena exist but are defined and experienced differently 
by different people dep ending on the class and race they belong to and the countries they live 
in. Basically the truth can vary from place to place and from time to time. (Easterby-Smith et 
al.2012). 
The viewpoint of nominalism suggests that whatever we name or call our experiences are 
crucial. The position suggests that there is no truth. Social real it y is created by people through 
language and discourse. How people try to establish different versions of the truth is the 
interesting question. (Easterby-Smith et aI.2012). 
The Ontology platform chosen is relativist and basically states that the truth can vary 
according to the location, time and individual experience. For example: 
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"It is aecepted that sodal class and raeial discrimination are dejined and experienced 
differently by different people and this will depend greatly on the classes and races to whieh 
they belong and the contexts or eountries in whieh they live. Thus there is no single reality 
that can somehow be discovered, but many perspeetives on the issue. The relativist position 
assumes that different observers may have different viewpoints" (Easterby-Smith et 
al.2012:20). 
One could say that; "what counts for truth can vary from place to place and from time to 
time" (Collins 1983: 88) 
This relativist position fits best in regard to the research carried out as the qualitative data was 
collected through a questionnaire and interviews. Both methods register the individual 
opinions of the different people who participated, in different locations and their experiences 
varied in time, i.e. not all of them experienced lean implementation attempts at the same time. 
In the previous section we saw that our ontological approach is relativistic. Now we have to 
see how we can leam about our problem, or determine our epistemological direction. 
Epistemology describes different ways to examine and find out about the nature of the 
physical and social worlds 
"Epistemology is about different ways of inquiring into the nature of the physical and social 
worlds" (Easterby-Smith et al.20l2:21). 
One could say that it is the study ofknowledge and justified belief. That is to say how we can 
establish what we really know about reality and how we can, in the case of social sciences, 
proceed to obtain knowledge about society and people. It is in a nutshell concemed with the 
nature of knowledge. 
Epistemology modifies the choice of the methodology and justifies the knowledge gleaned. 
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Fig 7 The simple relationship between Epistemology, Methodology and Method (Carter and Little 2007) 
A significant epistemological question is whether empirical data is needed to form the basis 
or foundation for research, or can knowledge be built solelyon pure thinking and reflection. 
According to the first perspective 
"Knowledge must be built on that which we obsenJe. Everything else is pure speculation. 
According to the second perspective there are powers and structures in society that we cannot 
obsenJe" (Adam Smith 1759). 
For the purpose of data gathering for this thesis I would like to stay with the first perspective 
i.e. the data gathered for this thesis is empirical. 
According to (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012), epistemology has focused on two contrasting 
views as to how soeial science research should be conducted. The one is Positivism and the 
other is Soda} constructionism. 
Positivism: 
The key idea of positivism is that: 
"The sodal world exists externally and its properties should be measured through 
objective methods rather than being inferred subjectively through sensation, reflection 
or intuition" (Easterby-Smith et al.2012:22). 
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(Easterby-Smith et al., 2012), states that positivism builds on the assumption that knowledge 
is only significant if it is based on the observations of an extemal reality being researched and 
the ontological assumption that reality is indeed extemal and objective. 
Sodal Constructionism: 
Social constructionism argues that reality in social sciences is not objective and exterior. 
Reality according to the epistemology ofsocial constructionism is based on people's 
experiences which they share mainly through language, that is to say that reality is defined 
more by people than by objective and extemal facts. The researcher using this epistemology 
should try to understand the how people' s experiences and understanding of situations will 
dictate their actions. 
The features ofthese to epistemologies are in direct contrast to each other. (See tab.2 
Tab 2 Contrasting implications ofpositivism and socia! constructionism (Easterby-Smith et al 2012) ., 
PositiviSl11 Sodal cOl1stmction 
The observer Must be independent Is a part of what is being observed 
Human interests Should be irrelevant Are the main drivers of science 
Explanations Must demonstrate causality Aim to increase general understanding 
of the situation 
Research progresses through Hypothesis and deductions Gathering rich data from which ideas 
are induced 
Concepts Need to be defined so that they can be Should incorporate stakeholder 
measured perspectives 
Units of analysis Should be reduced to the simplest terms May include the complexity of whole 
situations 
Generalization throu~h Statistical probability Theoretical abstraction 
Sampling requires Large numbers selected randomly Small numbers of cases chosen for 
specific reasons 
There is another distinction to be made and this is between constructionism and strong 
constructionism. 
"The idea of "normal" constructionism refers to those who construet their own 
knowledge, while accepting the existence of independent objective knowledge; 
whereas strong constructionism assumes that there is no difJerence between individual 
and sodal knowledge" (Easterby-Smith et al.,2012:25) 
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The epistemology this thesis is based on is mainly that of constructionism but overlaps a little 
in the analysis/interpretation area where in addition to triangulation one also indulges in 
sense-making and understanding. 
The questionnaire and interviews c1early accesses and uses the experiences ofthose who were 




The research started with a comprehensive review ofliterature on the Toyota phi10sophy, 
cu1ture, methodo10gy and too1s. The review identified aset ofkey criteria that, all the authors 
studied consistent1y insisted on, had to be met if one is to succeed in the imp1ementation of 
true, sustainable 1ean in the spirit of Toyota. 
Tab 3 Methodological implications ofdifferent epistemologies Easterby-Smith et al (2012'25) 
Ontologies Realism Internal Realism Relativism Nominalism 
:::s:: Strong Positivism Positivism Constructionism Strong Constructionism Methodology 
Aims Discovery Exposure Convergenee Inventinn 
Starting Points Hypothesis Propositions Questions Critiquc 
Designs Experiment Large slIl'veys. Cases and surveys Engagcment and 
multi -cases ret1exivity 
Data Types Numbers and facts Numbers and wllrds WOl'ds and numbel's Discourse and 
experiences 
Analysis/interpætation Verificatl(}11 ! COlTeIation and Triangulation and Sense-making 
tillsi jicalion regressioll (,'omparison undt,!'Standing 
Olltcomes COllfil1uation oftheories 'lbIXJry testing and Theory generation New lnsight and actiolls 
genel'ation 
Based on the epistemo10gy of constructionism, the methodo10gy chosen, to va1idate the 
propositions derived through the literature review, was a survey comprising of a questionnaire 
and a personal interview program. In keeping with the epistemo10gy of constructionism, the 
date types so obtained comprised of words and numbers. 
In the questionnaire the questions were put in a predetermined order and under the interviews 
the author did not in any way express his own views, but was just friend1y enough to facilitate 
information extraction. This traditiona1 model, Holloway and Jefferson (2000), assumes that 
ideas, feelings and know1edge that exist within a person and will come forth in the interview 
or the questionnaire, although the degree of truthfu1ness and comp1eteness can vary. 
There are two criteria that the success of this model is dependent on. One is how open and 
articu1ate the respondent is and the other is the skill of the researcher is with regard to creating 
good questions for the questionnaire and a1so in conducting the interviews. 
Data was gathered from three different groups, who had been invo1ved in the imp1ementation 
of Lean, the consultants who sell imp1ementation services, the top management who buys it 
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and the rest of the employees (middle management, supervisors and operators) who are 
directly involved in the day to day implementation and also bore the brunt of the work and 
frustrations involved. 
Twenty different reasons for failure were described in the questionnaire. All the reasons are 
relevant to and can be connected to the lack of one or more of the three success criteria. Each 
reason was grad ed on a scale of 1 - 10 with ten being the most important reason for failure 
and one being the least important. The average score for each of the twenty reasons was 
calculated from the returned questionnaires. The results are presented in table 5 
Reason for faUnre Lackof 
Philoso hy 










Tab. 5 Results 
Reason for failure Points 
Management docs nol understand the philosnphy of Lean Of ilS to\"c eoncepts 
Management lminvolved 
Management not competent (~nough to be teachers (sen sei) 
No real organizational (hange -··Iean is just something to try when people are not busy working 
There is no consistency of leadership 
Management wanb everyonc else to change bUl is lInwilling to change itself. 
Training ofpersonnelnot in keeping with the philosophies of Jean (lcaming organization 
Management trying to use kan as a quick fix for fast profits 
JmplemtJnling lean toolo5 taken out ofcontext·· not understanding thephilosophy or the principles behind th,' tools (exaggemted 
toens on 5S, kanban etc.) 
No total understanding ofwaste within the organization 
Implementation of "',m lell in the hands of cOllsultants 
Management dncs not devote enongh resources to the implementation 
C'oncept of empowerment is not underslood in the organization 
Short term profits more important lhan !ong-tenll henetits no continuity 
C'ontinuous improvement is ad-hoc, not can'led out scientifically and not sustainable 
Management convinced that lean is dependent 011 culture ( Japanese) 
Not adjusting the kan plinciples to tit own organilation - tl)'jng 10 carhon 00py Toyota 
Lean manufacturing or Six Sigma louis are nscd tn solve cvery problem 
M anagemem attempts to use lean as a method to rednee headcount 
Management does not understand the cOllcept of valne stream mapping 
During the interviews the interviewer, (the author) to en sure that there was no bias, did not 
respond in a substantive manner to what the interviewee was saying, The questions asked 
were open and great care was exercised to ensure that no leading or suggestive questions were 
employed, Below is a list of the main questions, 
• What do you think is necessary for the successful transition to lean manufacturing? 
• What in your opinion is the most difficult challenge? 
• Who should be responsible for the transition? 
• Who do you think should lead the transition? 
• Who did the training 
• Why do you think the implementation attempt failed? 
• How do you feel about the degree of management commitment? 
• What was the company philosophy? 
• How was the company philosophy communicated? 
• What training was given? 
• Where do you think the consultants were useful? 
• How do you feel about the consistency ofleadership? 
• What was the change strategy? 
• How do you feel about the tools that were recommended? 
• What was the effect? 






















The points below summarize the responses to the interview. 
• Top leaders were not involved other than in giving speeches and telling us lean was 
important 
• Leaders never did any training they did not know anything 
• There was never any company philosophy communicated 
• Nobody ever mentioned philosophy or culture 
• Leaders were only interested in the results of any improvement work. These had to 
come as quicklyas possible. 
• There was no formal training program or development program for the people 
• The leaders depended on the consultants for everything 
• We saw no advantage to all the boards and they hung up 
• We spent more time in meetings than in doing work 
What we can gather both from the results depicted in the questionnaire and the interviews 
conducted is that leaders are totally unaware ofwhat is really needed for the implementation 
oflean. 
41 
6. A brief history of manufacturing 
In the early days before the industrial revolution manufacturing was done by individual 
craftsmen making products one at a time, by hand. Settlements and villages were isolated and 
most manufacturing was really cottage industries. Where people made and sold whatever 
products were necessaryas a subsidiary to their main occupation which was agriculture. 
Textile manufacture is a good example ofthis where the people in the country made textiles 
cheaper than craftsmen in the city. The country folk also had a second source of income, 
agriculture. This enabled them to undercut the city craftsmen. 
The quality of the products manufactured by craft production was dependent on the skill of 
each individual craftsman but it was generally of good quality. Repairs however could be 
expensive. Any spare parts had to be hand crafted and one could safely say that 
interchangeability between parts was nonexistent. Delivery times were long and volum es 
were low. The manufacturing skills were passed on to the next generation either within the 
family (father to son etc.) or by training apprentices. 
The industrial revolution (1760 - 1850) replaced manpower with machines and muscle power 
with steam and later el ectri cit y to run the machines. This paved the way for the transition 
from craft production to mass production. This meant that machines could be used to make 
machines. As the precision of the machines increased the skill sets needed by the operators 
decreased. 
According to many historians mass production began around 1800. In America it was in Eli 
Whitney's firearms factory that the first the labor process that liken ed the labor process of 
modem industri al production was initiated. 
In England a French engineer Marc Brunel set up a process for producing wooden pulley 
blocks using a sequence ofmachine operations. Using this process he reduced the required 
work force from a 110men to 10 men to produce 160000 pulley blocks a year. 
During the 1880's - 1890's Taylor developed his ide as and they reached their peak during 
1910 - 1920. 
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The other factor that contributed to mass manufacturing was the assembly line. The first 
assembly lines were used by the 19th century meat packing industry in America. Henry Ford 
observed this and in 1913 designed his assembly line for the Ford plant. He started with the 
manufacturing line for magneto flywheels where he cut the manufacturing time for a wheel 
from 20 minutes to 5 minutes. He then introduced the pro cess to his chassis assembly and by 
the end of April 1914 had reduced the assembly time from an original 12.5 man hours to 93 
man minutes. The stage was set and mass production took off. However it should be noted 
that the key to the enormous success of mass production was not so much the moving 
assembly line but the complete and consistent interchangeability of parts and the simplicity of 
assembly i.e. attaching them to each other. 
From Fords manufacturing system developed the system that is hailed as the most efficient 
and effective manufacturing system of all the "Toyota Production System" or Lean 
Manufacturing as it is also called. In the 1930's Toyota was a struggling auto manufacturer 
making poor quality vehicles. They made mostly trucks. Their technology was extremely 
primitive. 
"Hammering body panels over lags" Liker (2004:20) 
The Toyota leaders after carefully reading Henry Ford's book "Today and Tomorrow" visited 
the Ford factory and GM studied mass manufacturing and the economies of sca1e and tested 
the mass manufacturing ideas in their 100m production. They realized two things. 
1. The Japanese market was too small and fragmented to support the high production 
volumes that the American mass manufacturing methods wou1d produce 
2. The Americans (Ford) were 10 times more productive than their counterparts in Japan 
The challenge then as Toyota realized was to adapt mass production to suit the home market. 
To survive they had to succeed in this endeavor. This, as history has shown, they 
accomplished with great success. The Korean War (June1950 - Ju1y1953) was, for Toyota, a 
great opportunity to grow and they did this with success and had a growing automotive 
business. 
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In 1950 when the Toyota leadership revisited the US they found that the mass manufacturing 
techniques from the 1930 had not changed much. What they observed was a lot ofwaste. On 
their return Eiji Toyoda gave Taiichi Ohno one task. This was to catch up with the Americans 
in three years. Ohno went down to the place where he was most comfortable, the shop floor, 
and The Toyota Production System or Lean Manufacturing was bom. 
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Fig. 8 From crafl to mass manufacturing to lean 
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Before proceeding any further I would like to c1arify the term "Lean Manufacturing". This 
term or nomenc1ature has been used and misunderstood on a worldwide basis and I wish to 
give the reader an orientation of how the term "Lean Manufacturing" originated. 
In 1985 the International Motor Vehic1e Program (IMVP) was started to undertake a detailed 
study of the new Japanese techniques in motor manufacturing. At the time the process of 
Craft Production and Mass production were defined and understood. An American engineer 
by the name of John Krafcik who was a member of the IMVP program posed a question. 
"How do we name the production system used by Toyota? He said. "It is not craft production 
or mass production so what shall we caU it? WeU since the Toyota Production System 
combines the advantages of craft production and mass production while avoiding the high 
costs of the former and the rigidity of the latter while using less of everything to produce 
quality products in enormous volumes and variety it was decided to caU it "Lean" 
manufacturing. 
The term "Lean Manufacturing" is therefore nothing more than another name for the "Toyota 
Production System" or its short form; TPS. 
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7. Traditional Mass Production Thinking 
TPS is in many ways an adaptation of mass manufacturing so what did Toyota do and not do 
when adapting mass manufacturing to suit their needs? 
To be able to better understand the do's and don'ts when implementing TPS one should also 
have an better understanding of mass manufacturing. 
Mass manufacturing is basically production en masse. Production is based on being able to 
manufacture large amounts of standardized products very quickly. One advantage is that exact 
copies of a defined product or spare part can be manufactured very quickly in large quantities. 
The assembly line is then used to send partially complete products down a designated 
production path to workers who each work on an individual step ofthe manufacturing 
process. This is far more efficient than craft production where a craftsman works on a whole 
product from start to finish. This solves the problem ofhaving to make or customize spare 
parts for individual product 
For the purpose ofthis thesis I will not describe craft production any further, but for the 
purpose oflater comparison with TPS, describe some of the main principles ofmass 
production. 
Let us take a look at the way equipment is organized in traditional mass production. As Mass 
Production is based on producing large numbers of the same product, the ideal way to 
organize your equipment and processes is to group similar machines and similarly skilled 
workers together. There is never any one piece flow which is a hallmark of Toyota. This leads 
to the fact that mass production thinking sets up departments based on different disciplines. 
For example most any company or plant in Norway is set up with a department of mechanical 
engineering, a department of electrical engineering, an accounting department, a purchasing 
warehousing and logistics department and a manufacturing department etc. The mechanical 
department can then be divided into sub-departments such as a sub-department for welding, a 
sub-department for sheet metal work and the like. The concept is to glean the following 
benefits or perceived benefits, the financial benefit oflarge scale manufacture i.e. economies 
of scale and flexibility of scheduling. 
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1. Economies of scale 
The definition of Economies of scale is; 
"The increase in efficiency of production as the number of goods being produced 
increases. Typically, a company that achieves economies of scale lowers the average 
cost per unit through increased production since fixed costs are shared over an 
increased number of 
goods " (http://www.investopedia.comltermsleleconomiesoftcale. asp#axzz2BH3Z5 ggQJ 
What this means is that mass production focuses on getting the most out of every man and 
machine regardless of internal or extemal customer demand. 
For example having one huge stamping press to meet the needs of all the facto ry 's products 
would lead to the smallest capital cost per piece. Y ou would then want to run that press flat 
out 100% of the time to get the greatest asset utilization stopping only to change dies. 
On paper this may look good but if there is no customer demand then who is buying the 
product. In times of great growth where customer demand is greater than rate of manufacture 
then one can get away with this. But the trick is to survive periods of no growth or even 
receSSlOn. 
Similarly by organizing people into departments you can focus on best practice in each 
professional specialty and squeeze the highest productivity (or innovation) out of each person. 
The danger here is however that you also cause an atmosphere of competition between 
departments and people get more concemed about the good of their department than the 
common good of the company as a whole. 
2. Apparent flexibility in scheduling 
When you put all the welders together in one department, it's easier for the welding 
department manager to schedule available machines and welders to any job that comes up. 
This sounds very efficient. In one piece flow cells, you take those welders and welding 
machines and dedicate them to a one piece cello They are now no longer free to do any other 
work that might come up. The point is should any other work than the work a customer pays 
for come up? 
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After World War 2 mass production focused solelyon costs or cost reduction. Companies 
focused on making bigger machines and through the economies of sca1e thinking tried to 
bring down the costs. People were not thought of as an asset. Organizations would strive to 
automate to rep1ace peop1e ifthe costs were justified. Liker (2004) 
ane of the descriptions ofmass production is that "the skill is built into the too1" which means 
that the worker using the too1 need not have the skill. This e1iminates the greatest resource any 
company has, its peop1e. Mass production all but e1iminates the use ofthe company's 
intellectua1 property, the brain power of its emp10yees, and therefore e1iminates the 
sustainable scientific continuous improvement that is a part of the foundation of 1ean 
manufacturing. 
If you make a journey through almost any organization in Norway you will probab1y see 
materials, invoicing, service calls and prototype parts in R&D etc. being transform ed into 
something the customer wants. But on c10ser inspection these are often being diverted into a 
pile of inventory somep1ace where they sit and wait for 10ng periods of time unti1 they can be 
moved to the next process step. 
Certain1y peop1e do not like to be diverted from their journeys and wait in 10ng lines. Taiichi 
Ohno, the father of lean, viewed materials as having the same degree of impatience. WHY? If 
any large batches of material are produced and then sit and wait to be processed, if service 
calls are backed up, ifR&D are receiving prototype parts they don't have time to test, then 
this sitting and waiting to be moved to the next operation becomes waste. This results in both 
your intern al and externa1 customers becoming impatient and no value is being added to your 
product and thereby to your business. Y ou are not making money as nobody is paying you for 
the waiting, the transport between the different departments or the extra personnel. 
This kind ofthinking ruled the manufacturing world, with the exception of Toyota unti1 the 
1980's. Then finally the business world got the message that Toyota had realized decades 
before. That focusing on the reduction of waste and qua1ity of product and process actually 
reduced costs more than when focusing on reducing on1y costs. Then in the 1990's through 
the work ofMIT's Auto Industry program, which really was a program to find out how and 
why Toyota and other Japanese manufacturers were so much better that U.S. manufacturers 
and through the best seller, "The Machine That Changed the World" (Womack et al. 1991), 
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based on the MIT program's research the manufacturing industry discovered "Lean 
Production". Let it, however, be said that discovering "Lean Manufacturing" does not in any 
way facilitate or guarantee its successful implementation. 
Traditional mass production thinking is one-sidedly focused on achieving the lowest possible 
unit cost and then creating proeedures and instructions to achieve the cost objective (fig. 9) 
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Fig. 9 Traditional unit eost foeused manufaeturing. Liker - 2006: 115) 
This method considers individual efforts and "co st per piece" while The Toyota Production 
System (TPS) seeks to optimize the entire company and considers "total cost" via waste 
reduction as the primary indicator of success. 
"Traditional mass production utilizes time and motion studies to determine the most 
"efficient" work procedure and a standard time is allotted for the designated task. 
Typically an operator is observed and the work elements and times are recorded. The 
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way the operator is carrying out his task at this moment may not be the best or most 
effective way. It 's just the way he is doing it at that point in time when being observed. 
This process creates a false standard that is then utilized to create efficiency" (Liker ~ 
2006: 114) 
Another serious flaw is that since this has been set as the standard there is no incentive to 
improve it. The system do es not in any way support the culture of continuous improvement 
that is needed to optimize all processes so that a company can be productive, efficient and 
competitive in times oflow economic growth or to survive periods of recession. 
Improvements made usually just cover one point or area. Sometimes these improvements to 
one area may be detrimental to another. This is because the system is not a whole system 
joined together by an uninterrupted flow, but a system of stand-alone departments each with 
its own manager striving for personal success through the success of his/her department with 
little consideration to the rest of the company. This negative impact is rarely discovered. As 
perfonnance is rewarded on an individual or departmental basis everyone is more likely to 
work hard for personal gain and the employees will not necessarily pull in the same direction. 
There will be a discrepancy between the goals ofthe organization contra the goals of the 
employees. The organization would strategically like to move in a defined direction but the 
combined work efforts of the employees (red arrows in fig. 10) most probably will not 
contribute to taking the organization in the direction it wants to be going. (fig. 1 O) 
Fig. ID shows discrepancy between goals o/the company and the goals o/the employees. 
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Organizations always speak ofteams and team-work. These are popular buzzwords in today's 
industri al world and many a consultant makes aliving propagating the concept. The sad part 
is these teams never last long or are not as effective as they could have been. Mass production 
thinking rarely gives teams and/or individuals the incentive to pull in the same direction for 
the common good of the whole organization as shown in figure 11. This is due to the fact that 
the reward system rewards only individuals and not the combined effort of all employees. 
Fig. 11 Organization where all teams and individual employees pull together in the same direction 
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8. How it all began - a brief history of the Origins of Toyota 
To understand TPS and the Toyota way, how Toyota became the world's most efficient 
manufacturer and to be ab1e to discuss the difficulties of imp1ementing genuine Lean and 
dup1icating Toyota's success it is important to first understand the history and personalities of 
the founding fami1y members and their life phi10sophies that 1eft an inde1ib1e mark on the 
cu1ture of Toyota. It is a1so necessary that one shou1d be familiar with these phi10sophies on 
which the foundations of the Toyota Way were 1aid, without being sidetracked by particu1ar 
too1s and aspects of the system such as Kanban, 5S, SMED (Single Minute, Exchange of Die) 
etc. TPS did not happen overnight but through a series of innovations over a period of 30 
years or so. I will give a brief description of the beginnings of Toyota and the mindset ofthe 
founding fathers and their c10sest associates. 
The Toyoda's were a family ofinnovators. They were pragmatic idea1ists, they learned by 
do ing and they a1ways be1ieved in the mission of contributing to society. They were re1entless 
in achieving their goa1s, but most importantly they were leaders who led by example. 
As Liker (2004) states the important thing is not so much that one fami1y has controlover the 
company. It is the remarkable consistency of 1eadership and phi10sophy that Toyota has 
achieved throughout its history. These roots of the Toyota phi10sophy and their princip1es can 
be directly traced back to the very beginnings of the organization. One cou1d say that every 
1eader is encoded with the "DNA" of the Toyota way. 
The story begins with Sakichi Toyoda, who grew up in the late 1800s in aremote farming 
vill age outside Nagoya. As a boy Sakichi 1earned carpentry from his father and eventually 
used that skill to design and bui1d spinning machines out ofwood. Weaving was a major 
small industry and the Japanese government encouraged the creation of cottage industries 
across the nation. In 1894 Sakichi began to make manual100ms that were cheaper but better 
than the existing 100ms. 
Sakichi Toyoda was p1eased with his 100ms but he was disturbed that his mother and 
grandmother still had to work so hard spinning and weaving with the manua1100ms. He 
wanted to find a way of re1ieving them of this punishing 1abor. He decided to deve10p a 
power-driven wooden 100m. 
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This was an age where inventors had to do everything themselves. There was no large R&D 
department to delegate the work to. When Toyoda first developed the power 100m there was 
no available power to run the 100m. Steam engines were the most common source of power so 
he bought a used steam engine and figured out by trial and error and by getting his hands dirty 
how to run the 100m from this power source. The "Getting your hands dirty" approach would 
become a part of the foundation of the Toyota Way, genchi gembutsu. 
In 1926 Sakichi Toyoda started Toyoda Automatie Loom Works, the parent firm ofthe 
Toyota Group and still a central player in the Toyota conglomerate. Toyoda's inventing 
genius resulted in sophisticated automatie power looms that became famous throughout 
world. Among his inventions was a special mechanism to automatically stop a 100m if a 
thread broke - an invention that evolved into a broader system and also became one of the 
pillars of the Toyota Production System called Jidoka (automation with a human touch or as 
Toyota describe it autonmation). Essentially jidoka means building in quality or mistake 
proofing as an integrated part of the production proeess itself. It also refers to designing 
production and equipment so your workers are not tied to machines and can perform other 
value adding tasks while the machines are running knowing, that if a fault occurs, the machine 
will automatically stop and not produee non-conforming products. 
Throughout his life Sakichi Toyoda was a great engineer and later referred to as Japans "King 
of Inventors" However his broader contribution to the development of Toyota was his 
philosophy and approach to his work, based on zeal and continuous improvement. 
Interestingly this philosophy and the ultimately the philosophy behind the "Toyota Way" was 
significantly influenced by his reading of a book first published in England in 1859 by Samuel 
Smiley entitled Self-Help. It preaches the virtues ofindustry, thrift, and self-improvement. It 
was illustrated with stories of great inventors like James Watt. The book so inspired Sakichi 
Toyoda that a copy of it is on display under glass in a museum set up at his birth site. There 
are a few important things in this book that influenced Toyoda. First of all Smiles' inspiration 
for writing the book was philanthropic. It grew out ofhis efforts to help young men, in 
difficult economic circumstances, who were focused on improving themselves. So Smiles 
goal was not to make money. 
The book chronicles great inventors whose natural drive and inquisitiveness led to great 
inventions that changed the course ofhumanity. These were accomplished not through naturai 
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talent but through hard work, perseverance and discipline. These are exactly the traits 
displayed by Sakichi Toyoda in making his power looms work with steam engines. The book 
emphasizes the importance of "management by facts" and getting people to pay attention 
actively - these are hallmarks of the Toyota's approach to problem solving based on genchi 
gembutsu. 
How many companies emphasize the importance of "management by facts" and getting 
people to pay attention actively? 
Sakichi Toyda's son Kiichiro Toyoda was given the task of setting up the Toyoda Motor 
Company. Sakichi Toyoda explained to his son: 
"Everybody should tackle some great project a least once in their life. I devoted most 
of my life to inventing looms. Now it is your turn. You should make an effort to 
complete something that will benejit society" Liker (2004: 18) 
Kiichiro stu di ed mechanical engineering at the prestigious Tokyo Imperial University 
focusing his studies on engine technology. His approach to leaming and creating mirrored that 
ofhis father. He too saw the great importance ofpractical work and experience on the shop 
floor. After world war two Kiichiro wrote: 
"I would have grave reservations about our ability to rebuild Japan 's industry if our 
engineers were the type who could sit down to lunch without ever having to wash their 
hands. " (Liker 2004: 18) 
Kiichiro built the Toyota Motor Company on his father's philosophy and management 
approach but he added his own innovations. While Sakichi Toyoda was the father of the 
jidoka pillar ofTPS, Just-in-time was Kiichiro Toyoda's c ontributi on. The idea for this and 
the Kanban system came from watching Ford during a study trip to the U.S and by seeing the 
U. S supermarket system of replenishing the products just in time as the customers bought 
them. 
In 1948, for reasons beyond the control ofKiichiro Toyoda, The Toyota Motor Company was 
on the brink ofbankruptcy. When voluntary pay cuts and other austerity measures did not 
work, Toyota asked, in spite of Kiichiro Toyoda's policy against firing employees, for the 
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voluntary retirement of 1600 workers. This led to work stoppages and public demonstrations 
by the workers. Here Kiichiro Toyoda did something that eamed him great respect. He 
himself accepted responsibility for the failing of the company and resigned as president even 
though in reality the problems were well beyond his or anyone else's control. His Personal 
sacrifice helped quell the worker dissatisfaction. More workers voluntarily left the company 
and labor peace was restored. Kiichiro' s tremendous personal sacrifice had an even more 
profound impact on the history of Toyota. Everyone at Toyota knew what he did and why. To 
this very day the philosophy of Toyota is to think beyond the individual concerns to the long 
term good of the company. 
In contrast when a company goes out of business in the west what do we hear? The usual 
story is the eEO hanging on and fighting to salvage his sweet options package or perhaps 
selling off the company to be broken up for any valuable assets. It is always somebody else's 
fault that the company has failed. 
Kichiro Toyoda was leading by example in away that is unfathomable to most ofus. All 
Toyoda family members grew up with similar philosophies. They alllearned to get their 
hands dirty, leamed the spirit ofinnovation and understood the value of the company in 
contributing to society. They leamed to accept responsibility and moreover they all had the 
vision of creating a special company with a long term future. 
After Kiichiro another member ofthe family leaders who influenced the company was 
Kiichiro's cousin Eiji Toyoda. When he graduated from the Tokyo Imperial University he 
was given the task of setting up a research lab in a "car hotel" in Shibaura. The "car hotel" 
was just a large parking garage. Here Eiji set up shop by clearing a room in a corner of the 
garage. He built up a group of about 10 peop1e in a year' s time. He researched machine too1s 
ofwhich he initially knew nothing. He checked defective cars by taking them apart and in his 
spare time he checked out companies that cou1d make auto parts for Toyota. 
He too like his uncle Sakichi and cousin Kiichiro grew up saturated by the same phi10sophies 
and work methods. Get your hands dirty and leam by doing were the order of the day. Eiji 
eventually became the president and then the chairman of Toyota Motor Manufacturing. How 
many chairmen in Norwegian or Scandinavian corporations can boast such hands-on 
experience and detail ed know1edge of the end-product? 
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Eiji Toyoda played a key role in se1ecting and empowering the 1eaders who shaped every 
facet of Toyota's activities from sa1es to engineering and product deve10pment to 
manufacturing and most important1y The Toyota Produetion system, common1y called TPS, 
or "Lean Manufacturing". 
In the 1930's whi1e Toyota Motor Corporation was strugg1ing Toyota's 1eaders visited Ford 
and GM to study their assemb1y lines. Back home they tested the conveyor system, precision 
machine too1s and the economies of large sca1e production idea in their 100m production and 
realized that Japanese market was too small and the demand too fragmented to support high 
production volurnes as in the U.S. The Toyota mangers realized that ifthey were to survive in 
the 10ng run they wou1d have to adapt the mass production approach for the Japanese market. 
The question was, how? 
The greatestasset that the Toyota Motor Company acquired was Taiichi Ohno who moved 
over from the Toyota 100m company to the Toyota Motor Manufacturing company. He joined 
Kiichiro Toyoda's 100m company in 1932 and moved to Toyota Motor Manufacturing in 
1943. Taiichi Ohno is wide1y credited with being the father of the Toyota Production System. 
In the early 1950's Eiji Toyoda returned from another U.S tour and gave Ohno a huge 
assignment. The assignment was to improve Toyota's manufacturing system so that it was as 
productive as Ford's. He was given a time-frame ofthree years. 
Toyota had nothing of the enormous resources in cash, machinery, infrastructure, etc. that 
ford had at his fingertips. Based on the conditions of the day this was like David taking on 
Goliath. 
The Toyota managers however did not think this impossible. On their 12 week study tour of 
the U.S. p1ants in the 1950's they had expected to be dazz1ed by the progress and 
improvements to the manufacturing processes in the U.S. Instead they saw that nothing much 
had changed since the 1930's. They noticed that the system had many inherent flaws. 
What they saw was 10ts of equipment making large amounts of product that was then stored in 
inventory, on1y to be later moved to another department where big equipment further 
processed the product, and so on to the next step. They saw how these discrete steps were 
based on large volumes, with interruptions between the steps causing large amounts of 
material to sit in inventory and wait for longer periods oftime. They also observed the high 
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cost of the equipment and it's so called efficiency in reducing the cost per piece, with the 
workers keeping busy by keeping the machines busy. 
They looked at the traditional accounting measures that rewarded managers who cranked out 
lots of parts and kept workers ad machines busy. This only resulted in a lot of overproduction 
and a very uneven flow, with defects hidden in these large batches that could go undiscovered 
for weeks. Entire workplaces were disorganized and out of control. With big forklifts moving 
mountains of materials everywhere, the factories looked more like warehouses than 
production plants. 
The Toyota mangers were to say the very least not impressed. In faet they saw an 
opportunity to eateh up. 
Taiichi Ohno's assignment from his boss Eiji Toyoda was not to compete head on with Ford 
but to focus on improving Toyotas manufacturing within the protected Japanese market. This 
in itselfwas adaunting task. What did Ohno do? He benchmarked the competition through 
further visits to the U.S. He also studied Henry Ford's book "Today and Tomorrow". Ohno 
believed that one of the major components ofmanufacturing that Toyota needed to master 
was continuous flow. The best example at the time was Ford's moving assembly line. In his 
book Ford also preached the importance of creating continuous material flow, standardizing 
processes and eliminating waste. But while he preached it his company didn't practice it with 
any degree of diligence or success. One can assurne it was the reward system where quantity 
was the main criterion that was the root cause ofthis. 
Ford tumed out millions of black Model T's and later Model A's us ing wasteful batch 
production methods that built up large banks ofwork-in-process inventory throughout the 
value chain pushing the product onto the stage ofproduction (Womack et al. 1991). Toyota 
saw this as an inherent flaw in Ford's mass production system. Toyota could not allow itself 
the luxury of creating waste during production. They lacked warehouse space and money. 
They did not produce large volurnes of just one type of vehicle. They were however 
determine to use Ford's original idea of continuous material flow (as illustrated by the 
assembly line) to develop a system of one-piece flow that was flexible enough to be changed 
according to customer demand and was efficient at the same time. This type of flexibility 
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requires marshaling the ingenuity ofthe workers to develop a continuous improvement 
system and philosophy to continually improve all processes in the plant. 
In the 1950's Ohno returned to the place he understood best, the shop floor, and went to work 
to change the rules of the manufacturing game. One must remember that he did not have big 
consulting firms, post it notes or Power Point presentations to reinvent his business processes. 
He could not install an ERP (Enterprise resource planning) system or use the internet to make 
information move at the speed oflight. But he was armed with his shop floor knowledge, 
dedicated engineers, managers and workers who would give their all to help the company 
succeed. With this he began his many hands onjourneys through Toyota's few factories 
applying the philosophies and developing the principles of The Toyota Production System. 
We must remember that Ohno and his team did not do this work alone. The irony of it is that 
TPS borrowed many ofits ideas from the U.S. and Henry Ford. For example one very 
important ide a was the concept of the "pull system" which was inspired by the American 
supermarkets. In any well run supermarket individual items are replenished as each item 
begins to run low on the shelf. Material replenishment is initiated by consumption. Applied to 
the shop floor it means that ste p 1 in a process shouldn't make more parts (replenish) until the 
next process step - step 2 uses up its original stock from step 1. In TPS when step two is 
down to a small number of safety-stock a signal is triggered to step 1 asking for more parts 
(Kanban system). This eliminates the costs ofstocks ofwork-in-progress materiallying 
around waiting to be processed. 
Toyota also to ok to heart the teachings of the American quality pioneer and guru E. Edwards 
Deming. Deming's teachings were at this time not taken seriously in America. He taught that 
meeting and exceeding customer requirements was the task of everyone within the 
organization. Most importantly Deming broadened the definition of "customer" to include 
internal customers. An operator in production normally cannot relate to external customers or 
end users. His customer is the next person or pro cess step that takes over his work and adds 
further value to it on its way through to being a finished product. This meant that each person 
or step in a production line or business process was to be treated as a "customer" and to be 
supplied with exactly what was needed, at the exact time, in the exact quantity and to the 
specified quality. This was the origin of the Deming principle "the next process-step is the 
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customer". The Japanese phrase for this "atokotei wa o-kyakusama", became one of the most 
significant expressions in the Just-In-Time system. (Liker - 2004) 
Let it be said that when Ohno and his team finally emerged from the shop floor with a new 
manufacturing system, it wasn't only for one company in a particular market and culture. 
What they had created was a new paradigm in manufacturing or service and delivery. It was a 
new way of seeing, understanding and interpreting what is happening in any type of 
production process that could propel beyond the mass production system. By the 1960's TPS 
was a powerful philosophy and system that all types ofbusinesses and processes could leam 
to use. Toyota took the first steps to spre ad "Lean" by diligently teaching the principles of 
TPS to their key suppliers. This moved its isolated Lean manufacturing plants towards a total 
Lean extended enterprise - where everyone including your suppliers is practicing the same 
TPS principles - a powerful business model indeed. 
One can say that Toyota effectively combined the advantages of mass production with the 
advantages of craft production to come up with TPS. 
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9. The Toyota Way 
The fourteen (14) principles described below define the foundations and the philosophy of 
The Toyota Way. This is the way The Toyota Corporation conducts its business. 
Principle 1 
Base your management decisions on a long-term philosophy, even at the expense of short-
term jinancial goals. 
• Have a philosophical sense of purpose that supersedes any short-term decision 
making. Work, grow, and align the whole organization toward a common purpose that 
is bigger than making money. Understand your place in the history of the company 
and work to bring the company to the next level. Y our philosophical mission is the 
foundation for all the other principles. 
• Generate value for the customer, society, and the economy-it is your starting point. 
Evaluate every function in the company in terms of its ability to achieve this. 
• Be responsible. Strive to decide your own fate. Act with self-reliance and trust in your 
own abilities. Accept responsibility for your conduct and maintain and improve the 
skills that enable you to produce added value. 
Sectirm 11: The Right Proæss wm Prodl1æ the Right ResuJts 
Principle 2 
Create a continuous proeess flow to bring problems to the surface. 
• Redesign work processes to achieve high value-added, continuous flow. Strive to cut 
back to zero the amount oftime that any work project is sitting idle or waiting for 
someone to work on it. 
• Create flow to move material and information fast as well as to link processes and 
people together so that problems surface right away. 
• Make flow evident throughout your organizational culture. It is the key to a true 
continuous improvement process and to developing people. 
Principle 3 
Use "pull" systems to avoid overproduction. 
• Provide your down line customers in the production process with what they want, 
when they want it, and in the amount they want. Material replenishment initiated by 
consumption is the basic principle of just-in time. 
• Minimize your work in process and warehousing of inventory by stocking small 
amounts of each product and frequently restocking based on what the customer 
actually takes away. 
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• Be responsive to the day-by-day shifts in customer demand rather than relying on 
computer schedules and systems to track wasteful inventory. 
Principle 4 
Level out the workload (heijunka). (Work like the tortoise, not the hare.) 
• Eliminating waste is just one-third ofthe equation for making lean successful. 
Eliminating overburden to people and equipment and eliminating unevenness in the 
production schedule are just as important-yet generally not understood at companies 
attempting to implement lean principles. 
• Work to level out the workload of all manufacturing and service processes as an 
alternative to the stop/start approach ofworking on projects in batches that is typical at 
most companies. 
Principle 5 
Build a culture of stopping to fix problems, to get quality right the first time. 
• Quality for the customer drives your value proposition. 
• Use all the modem quality assurance methods available. 
• Build into your equipment the capability of detecting problems and stopping itself. 
Develop a visual system to alert team or project leaders that a machine or process 
needs assistance. Jidoka (machines with human intelligence) is the foundation for 
"building in" quality. 
• Build into your organization support systems to quickly solve problems and put in 
place countermeasures. 
• Build into your culture the philosophy of stopping or slowing down to get quality right 
the first time to enhance productivity in the long run. 
Principle 6 
Standardized tasks and proeesses are the foundation for continuous improvement and 
employee empowerment. 
• Use stable, repeatable methods everywhere to maintain the predictability, regular 
timing, and regular output ofyour processes. It is the foundation for flow and pull. 
• Capture the accumulated learning about a process up to a point in time by 
standardizing today's best practices. Allow creative and individual expression to 
improve upon the standard; then incorporate it into the new standard so that when a 
person moves on you can hand off the learning to the next person. 
Principle 7 
U se visual control so no problems are hidden. 
• Use simple visual indicators to help people determine immediately whether they are in 
a standard condition or deviating from it. 
• Avoid using a computer screen when it moves the worker's focus away from the 
workplace. 
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• Design simple visual systems at the place where the work is done, to support flow and 
pull. 
• Reduce your reports to one piece of paper whenever possible, even for your most 
important financial decisions. (A3 reports) 
Principle 8 
Use only reliable, thoroughly tested technology that serves your people and processes. 
• Use technology to support people, not to replace people. Often it is best to work out a 
process manually before adding technology to support the process. 
• New technology is often unreliable and difficult to standardize and therefore 
endangers "flow." A proven proeess that works generally takes precedence over new 
and untested technology. 
• Conduct actual tests before adopting new technology in business processes, 
manufacturing systems, or products. 
• Reject or modify technologies that conflict with your culture or that might disrupt 
stability, reliability, and predictability. 
• Nevertheless, encourage your people to consider new technologies when looking into 
new approaches to work. Quickly implement a thoroughly considered technology if it 
has been proven in trials and it can improve flow in your processes. 
SecUon Ill: Add Va/lle to the Orgcmization bv Developing VOll,. people and partners 
Principle 9 
Grow leaders who thoroughly understand the work, live the philosophy, and teach it to 
others. 
• Grow leaders from within, rather than buying them from outside the organization. 
• Do not view the leader's job as simply accomplishing tasks and having good people 
skills. Leaders must be role models of the company's philosophy and way of doing 
business. 
• A good leader must understand the daily work in great detail so he or she can be the 
best teacher ofyour company's philosophy. 
Principle 10 
Develop exceptional people and teams who follow your company's philosophy. 
• Create a strong, stable culture in which company values and beliefs are widely shared 
and lived out over a period of many years. 
• Train exceptional individuals and teams to work within the corporate philosophy to 
achieve exceptional results. Work very hard to reinforce the culture continually. 
• Use cross-functional teams to improve quality and productivity and enhance flow by 
solving difficult technical problems. Empowerment occurs when people use the 
company's tools to improve the company. 
• Make an ongoing effort to teach individuals how to work together as teams toward 
common goals. Teamwork is something that has to be leamed. 
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Principle 11 
Respect your extended network of partners and suppliers by challenging them and 
helping them improve. 
• Have respect for your partners and suppliers and treat them as an extension of your 
business. 
• Challenge your outside business partners to grow and develop. It shows that you value 
them. Set challenging targets and assists your partners in achieving them. 
Principle 12 
Go and see for your-self to thoroughly understand the situation (genchi genbutsu). 
• Solve problems and improve processes by going to the source and personally 
observing and verifying data rather than theorizing on the basis ofwhat other people 
or the computer screen tell you. 
• Think and speak based on personally verified data. 
• Even high-level managers and executives should go and see things for themselves, so 
they will have more than a superficial understanding of the situation. 
Principle 13 
Make decisions slowly by consensus, thoroughly considering all options; implement 
decisions rapidly (nemawashi). 
• Do not pick a single direction and go down that one path until you have thoroughly 
considered alternatives. When you have picked, move quickly and cautiously down 
the path. 
• Nemawashi is the process of discussing problems and potential solutions with all of 
those affected, to collect their ideas and get agreement on a path forward. This 
consensus process, though time-consuming, helps broaden the search for solutions, 
and once a decision is made, the stage is set for rapid implementation. 
Principle 14 
Become a learning organization through relentless reflection (hansei) and continuous 
improvement (kaizen). 
• Once you have established a stable process, use continuous improvement tools to 
determine the root cause of inefficiencies and apply effective countermeasures. 
• Design processes that require almost no inventory. This will make wasted time and 
resources visible for all to see. Once waste is exposed, have employees use a 
continuous improvement pro cess (kaizen) to eliminate it. 
• Protect the organizational knowledge base by developing stable personnel, slow 
promotion, and very careful succession systems. 
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• Use hansei (refleetion) at key milestones and after you finish a project to openly 
identifyall the shortcomings of the project. Develop countermeasures to avoid the 
same mistakes again. 
• Leam by standardizing the best practices, rather than reinventing the wheel with each 
new project and each new manager. 
The 14 principles above are described in Liker (2004: 37 - 41) 
The Toyota way is centered on the philosophy that people truly are the greatest asset. 
Toyota's leaders are very fond of saying that they don'tjust build cars they build people 
Liker (2004) 
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10. The Toyota Production System (TPS) 
The goal of the Toyota Production System is to provide products at world class quality levels 
to meet the expectations of customers, and to be a model of corporate responsibility within 
industry and the surrounding community. The Toyota Production System historically has had 
four basic aims that are consistent with these values and objectives: The four goals are as 
follows: 
1. Provide world class quality and service to the customer. 
2. Develop each employee's potential, based on mutual respect, trust and cooperation. 
3. Reduce cost through the elimination of waste and maximize profit 
4. Develop flexible production standards based on market demand. 
Being a lean manufacturer requires a way of thinking that focuses on first defining what is of 
real value to the customer and then making the product flow through the value adding process 
without interruption (one-piece flow). This is accomplished by implementing a pull system 
that cascades back from customer demand through the whole production process. This means 
replenishing, at short intervals, only what the next operation downstream uses. This is 
supported by a culture in which everyone is striving continuously to improve. Here comes the 
rub. Even though lean includes flow and pull production real TPS or lean is not just about 
"flow" or "pull production" or "cellular manufacturing" or any of the other catchy phrases or 
tools you may frequently hear. 
It is quite possible to use a variety ofTPS tools and still be following only a select few ofthe 
Toyota Way principles. The result will be short-term jumps on performance measures that are 
not sustainable. This is what usually happ ens when most organizations attempt to implement 
lean. On the other hand, an organization that truly understands and practices the full set of 
Toyota Way principles can successfully implement TPS and be on its way to gaining a 
sustainable competitive advantage. 
Sometimes one hears the question "How does TPS apply to my business? We do not make 
high-volume cars; we make low volume, specialized products" or "We are a professional 
service organization so TPS does not apply to us." This line ofthinking clearly shows that 
they really do not understand what lean is all about and are completely missing the point. 
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Lean is not about imitating the tools used by Toyota in a particular manufacturing proeess. 
Lean is about deve10ping principles and proeesses that are right for your organization and 
diligently practicing them to achieve high perfonnanee that continues to add value to 
customers and society. This means, of course, being competitive and profitable. To be able 
to do this one has to be able to reduce manufacturing costs, 
Let us take a look at the fonnula 
Seiling price = profit + actual co st 
Here we are trying to make the customer or consumer responsible for all the costs. This 
principle has no place in today's competitive business world, be it in the motor, cell phone or 
any other consumer goods industry. Today cool-headed, knowledgeable customers with a 
myriad ofbrands and choices within a given industry can pick and choose from hundreds of 
different and competing companies and products. They do not care about manufacturing 
costs. It is not their problem and they will not shoulder this burden. The only question is ifthe 
product is ofvalue to the buyer. If a high price is set because of the manufacturer's co st, 
consumers will simply turn away. 
Cost reduction (fig.12) must be the goal of consumer goods manufacturers trying to survive 
in the market today. During a period ofhigh growth any manufacturer can achieve lower costs 
with higher production. The challenge is to survive and achieve cost reduction in the low 
growth periods. 




Although mathematically similar to the earlier fonnula the picture portrayed by this fonnula is 
radically different. Toyotas profits dep end on how much oftheir production costs they can 
reduce. 
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There is no magic method. A total management system, that develops human ability to its 
fullest capacity to best enhance creativity and fruitfulness, to utilize facilities and machines 
well and there-by eliminate all waste, is not only needed, it is imperative. The Toyota 
Production System with its two pillars of Just in Time (JIT) and Built in Quality (Jidoka) 
advocating the absolute elimination of all waste is just such a system and was bom in Japan 
out ofthe necessity for survival. 
Today in this time of slow economic growth worldwide and recession, The Toyota Production 
System and the Toyota Way philosophy, represents a concept and philosophy in management 
that will work for any type of business. 
For over fifty years Toyota has been concerned with making a profit, and satisfying the 
eustorner with the highest possible quality at the lowest cost in the shortest lead-time. TPS has 
enabled them to achieve this goal by developing the talents and skills of its workforce through 
rigorous improvement routines and problem solving disciplines. In every piece ofTPS 
literature from Toyota, this stated aim is mixed in with the twin production principles of Just 
in Time (make and deliver the right part, in the right amount, at the right time), and Jidoka 
(build in quality at the proeess ), as well as the notion of continuous improvement by 
standardization and elimination of waste in all operations to improve quality, cost, 
productivity, lead-time, safety, morale and other metrics as needed. This c1ear objective has 
not substantially changed since the first intern al TPS training manual was draft ed over fort y 
years ago. 
The Toyota Production system and its workings are beautifully depicted in the figure 
commonly known as the "TPS house". (See fig. 13) 
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Fig. 13 the Toyota production system - TPS house Liker (2004: 33) 
As one can see from the figure above the two pillars Just in Time (JIT) and Built in Quality 
(Jidoka) stand solid1y p1anted on a foundation built up of the following four main components 
1. The Toyota Way Phi10sophy 
2. Visua1 Management - management commitment 
3. Stable and standardized proeesses - the four ru1es in use 
4. Leveled Production - Kanban 
Within the house one can see that peop1e working as teams are the instigators of continuous 
improvement through waste reduction. The final results are described in the roof. The house 
illustrates that these final results are obtained (held up) by the foundation and pillars of the 
house. 
The too1s that are so popu1ar with consultants and most companies trying to go "Lean" are not 
mentioned in the pillars or foundation. The pillars and foundations are the causes of the final 
results. The too1s are just us ed as needed as a means to get from the cause to the result or to be 
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discarded when not needed. Toyota has a myriad oftools, methods and systems, all ofwhich 
are designed to facilitate and strengthen the two pillars and the foundation of the Toyota 
House. In other words these tools are used when following the four Rules in U se. The driving 
force of TPS is at all times identifying and eliminating the three deadly sins in any kind of 
enterprise. 
l. Mura - un even production 
2. Muri - overwork 
3. Muda - waste 
These three will be explained more closely in a following chapter. 
To give the reader an understanding of the Toyota Production System I will describe in a little 
more detail the main points of the two pillars of the house and the foundation of the house. 
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Just-in-time (HT) was Kiichiro Toyoda's brain child. 
HT means that in a flow process the right parts needed in assembly reach the assembly line 
only when they are needed and only in the amount needed. A company establishing this flow 
throughout, with the systems needed to support JIT, can approach Zero inventory. This is 
an ideal state for production and thereby product management. 
So how does HT work? The principle is to look at the production line in reverse. Where a 
latter process step goes to the step before it to pick up only the right part in the quantities 
needed and at the exact time it is needed. Now in a system like this isn't it logical for the 
earlier process to make only the number of parts that the later process withdraws? 
Every link in the Just-in-time chain is connected and synchronized. This enables the 
management work force to be drastically reduced. This is in itself is a huge saving as 
managerial staff rarely contributes to any value adding work. 
Now to make this system work, as far as communication between the different process steps 
is concemed, it is then sufficient to clearly indicate what and how many parts are needed. This 
means of communication or indication of needs, which among other things eliminates the use 
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of managers, is called Kanban (signboard) and is a part of the foundation ofTPS and will be 
described later on in more detail. 
So what are the great advantages of JIT? Let us first take a look at the traditional factory set 
up where each department lives a life of its own totally and is to a great extent unconnected 
with the rest of the organization. 
This is when each process step has its own production schedule and produces a budgeted 
amount of product whether ne ed ed immediately or not. Each department needs a manager and 
his perfonnance is measured according to the amount of parts his department produces. 
This inducement then pushes the manager or foreman of each process step to produce 
according to his/her schedule without regard to necessity. No regard is shown to the fact that a 
process step down stream might have problems and cannot process incoming material. This in 
turn creates enonnous piles ofwork in progress and increases the need for floor space and 
warehousing. Workers will be engaged in wasteful non-value adding work mo ving half-
finished material from workstation to warehouse and back etc. Fig. 14 below shows the 
traditional factory set up organized by departments consisting of the warehouse, the cutting 
department, the grinding department, the heating department etc. each with a separate 
manager and specialized workers with forklift trucks moving piles of inventory between the 
departments. 
TRADITIONAL FACTORY LA YOUT* 
Fig. 14 Traditional jactO/y set up 
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When JIT is implemented effectively it eliminates what is considered the greatest waste of all 
over-production. In addition it eliminates the waste of rework. If only the exact number of 
parts that the next proeess step needs is produced, any non-confonning product will be 
discovered immediately by this proeess step. They will then infonn the previous proeess step 
allowing them to correct the problem before making more non-confonning product. This way 
not many non-confonning product is produced and the cost of re-worklscrapping is eliminated 
or kept to a minimum. This is also a great quality control. In the case of mass production 
where JIT is not used a previous proeess can chum out hundreds of non-confonning parts 
before it is discovered causing huge expenses due to re-work or scrapping. The cost of 
warehousing is also practically eliminated as suppliers (vendors) arrive with the required raw 
materials just-in-time. Figure 15 gives a simple example of a Lean manufacturing Just-in-
Time set up. 
ruST -IN-TIME CELLULAR FACTORY LAYOUT * 
Fig. 15 set up for JIT 
The factory in fig. 15 is reorganized into four cells or production lines with all the necessary 
machines needed to manufacture the finished product. As one can easily see the arrangement 
needs fewer supervisors, workers and fork lift trucks. There is much less piles ofwork in 
progress and no finished goods inventory. The cost of production has been significantly 
reduced. 
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A word ofwarning is in place here. When implementing JIT, a company must make sure that 
the systems needed to support JIT are in place. If these systems are not in place, trying to 
implement JIT can be catastrophic for an organization. This is another of the big mistakes 
made by many companies. JIT is a delicate system one has to take into consideration the 
"hiccups" that can turn up in any organization. These can be a mistake in paper work, 
defective product, trouble with equipment, absenteeism - the problems are countless. These 
problems will, if not handled properly, cause the stoppage of the production line in a JIT 
system causing loss in productivity and profitability. 
If an organization disregards such problems and tries to implement JIT as a stand-alone tool it 
will be doomed to failure. The result will still be the production of parts without reg ard to the 
needs of the later process steps. This would result in waste. Defective parts and huge 
inventories ofparts not needed immediately would certainly be two of the major wastes 
generated. This again reduces both productivity and profitability. Furthermore the operators 
willlose faith in the system. It will be harder to change their opinion at a later time for 
another try. The company can then lose one of their most valuable assets, the knowledge of 
their employees. 
To sum up Just-In-Time is; 
Making only "what is needed, when it is needed, and in the amount needed!" 
JIT Produces quality products efficiently and profitably through the complete elimination of 
wastes such as inconsistencies, unnecessary stocks ofWIP (work in progress), unreasonable 
requirements on the production line, leveled production and minimum transport etc. 
In order to deliver a product ordered by a customer as quicklyas possible, the product is 
efficiently built within the shOliest possible period of time by adhering to the following: 
1. When an order is received, a production instruction must be issued to the beginning of the 
production line as soon as possible. 
2. The assembly line must be stocked with required number of all needed parts so that any 
type of ordered product can be manufactured. 
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3. The assembly line must replace the parts used by retrieving the same number of parts 
from the parts-producing proeess (the preceding proeess). 
4. The preceding pro cess must be stocked with small numbers of all types of parts and 
produee only the numbers of parts that were retrieved by an operator from the next 
proeess. 
The JIT concept aims to produee and deliver the right parts, in the right amount, at the right 
time using the minimum necessary resources. This system reduces inventory and manning to 
a minimum, and strives to prevent both early and over production. 
Producing in a JIT fashion exposes problems quickly. By having minimum inventory in a 
system, the "rocks" (obstacles) below the surface that are disrupting the flow in the 
production stream are quickly exposed. Most companies shy away from sol ving problems 
immediately and use inventory to hi de these problem and avoid potential disruptions. At 
Toyota however the opposite logic is applied. By reducing inventory you expose the real 
problems in a production process quickly and focus on the ne ed for improvement. This notion 
of sur/acing problems and abnormalities is a critical concept in TPS. Of course unless you 
can solve the problem that you expose quickly there is a danger to this approach. 
1 BuHt 
The other pillar ofthe Toyota Production System is the Built in quality (Jidoka). Toyota even 
coined a new name for this "Autonomation". This is not to be confused with simple 
automation. Autonomation can be defined as automation with a human touch or human 
intelligence. In other words Toyota builds "human intelligence" into their machines. Many 
machines operate by themselves at the turn of a switch. 
Today's machines have such high performance production capability that even a small 
abnormality, such as a tiny piece of scrap falling into the machine can damage it in some way 
or that it can then be put off its settings so as to produce non-conforming goods. When this 
happens the automatic machine will keep on producing anyway resulting in hundreds if not 
thousands of defective goods are produced and quickly pile up. With automated machines this 
type of mass production of defective products cannot be prevented. There is no built in 
automatic checking system against such mishaps. 
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This is why Toyota emphasizes autonomation. Autonomation is about machines that can 
prevent the above mentioned problems autonomously - over simple automation. The idea 
itself originated with the invention of the auto-activated weaving machine by Sakichi Toyoda 
(1867 - 1930) the founder of the Toyota Motor Company. The 100m stopp ed immediately if 
any one of the warp or weft threads broke. This is because the machine could distinguish 
between the normal and abnormal condition. That is to say the ability to distinguish between 
ifthere something wrong (thread broken) or if everything all right was built into the machine. 
This ensures that defective product is not produced. Quality assurance is built into the 
automated system. The machine is given a bit of human intelligence. 
At Toyota a machine automated with a human touch is one that is attached to an automatic 
stopping device. In all Toyota plants most machines are equipped such devices as well as 
safety devices and other fool-proofing systems to prevent defective products from being 
manufactured. In this manner Toyota provides human intelligence or a human touch to its 
automatic machines. This is what is termed "autonomation" . 
Autonomation changes the meaning of management work as well. In a plant with 
autonomation an operator is not needed for every machine and as long as the machine in 
running in a normal condition the operator can carry out other necessary tasks. It is only when 
a machine stops because of some abnorm al condition that it gets the attention of an operator. 
As aresult one operator can attend severai machines again making it possible to reduce the 
number of operators and increase production efficiency. So the key to successful 
autonomation is to give human intelligence to the machine and to simplify the movement of 
the human operator between the autonomous machines. Autonomation then performs a dual 
role. It eliminates overproduction one of the largest wastes in manufacturing and it prevents 
the production of defective products. 
• To sum up the Jidoka or autonomation concept; 
• Quality must be built in during the manufacturing process! 
• There must be no overproduction! 
If equipment malfunctions, a defective part is discovered, or the defined production quantity 
is achieved the affected machine automatically stops, and operators cease production and if 
necessary correct any problems 
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1. Jidoka means that a machine safely stops when the nonnal processing is completed. It 
also means that, should a quality / equipment problem arise, the machine detects the 
problem on its own and stops, preventing defective products from being produced. As 
aresult, only products satisfying quality standards will be passed on to the following 
process steps on the production line. 
2. Since a machine automatically stops when processing is completed or when a problem 
arises and is communicated via the "andon" (problem display board), operators can 
confidently continue perfonning work at another machine, as well as easily identify 
the problem's cause to prevent its recurrence. This means that each operator can be in 
charge of many machines, resulting in higher productivity. 
10,3. The behveel1 the - JJT Jidoka 
What is the relationship between the two pillars holding up the Toyota Production System. 
For the Just-in-Time system to function, all ofthe parts that are made and supplied must meet 
predetennined quality standards. This is achieved through jidoka. 
Ohno (1988) uses the analogy of a baseball team. Autonomation corresponds to the skill and 
talent ofthe individual players while Just-in-time is the team work involved in reaching an 
agreed upon objective. For example a player in the outfield has nothing to do as long as the 
pitcher has no problems. But when a problem arises, - the opposing batter gets a hit - this 
activates the appropriate out-fielder who catches the ball and throws it to the baseman "just in 
time" to put the runner out. 
Managers and supervisors in a manufacturing plant are like the team manager and the coaches 
respectively. A strong baseball team has mastered the plays; the players can meet any 
situation with coordinated action. In manufacturing the production team that has mastered the 
just-in-time system is exactly like a baseball team that plays well together. 
Autonomation then perfonns a dual role. It eliminates overproduction which is one of the 
largest wastes in manufacturing and it prevents the production of defective products. To 
accomplish this standard work proeedures, corresponding to each player's ability, must be 
adhered to at all times. When abnonnalities arise - that is when a player' s ability is not 
peaking or he is perfonning under par (not adhering to procedures or is unable to do so) 
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special instruction must be given to bring the player back to normal. This is then an important 
duty of the coach (supervisor). In the automated system visual control or "management by 
sight" can bring production weaknesses (in each player that is) to the surface. This allows the 
coaches and team manager to take measures to strengthen the players involved. 
A championship team combines good teamwork with individual skill to reach the best 
possible results. Likewise a production line where just-in-time and autonomation work 
together is much stronger and more efficient than other lines. Us power is the synergy of 
these two factors. 
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11. The foundation of the TPS house 
. I will now describe the foundation of the TPS house. The foundation is mainly comprised of 
these four elements. 
• The Toyota Way Philosophy 
• Visual Management - management commitment 
• Stable and standardized proeesses - the four rules in use 
• Leveled Production - Kanban 
I have already, in chapter nine, described in some detail the Toyota philosophy. I will now 
discuss the concept of leveled production. 
11. L Leveled .;,.,..-". 
The Japanese term for leveled production is "Heijunka" and refers leveling production so as 
to achieve a more even and consistent flow of product and thereby work through the whole 
production line. As you can see Heijunka is designed to leve1 the production volume and to 
leve1 the production by product type. 
Toyota' s philosophy is that lack of leve1 production leads to two of the deadly sins mentioned 
e1sewhere in this paper. These two sins are "Muri" which means uneven production and 
"Mura" which means overwork. These two in turn lead to "Muda" which means waste. These 
terms and concepts will be explained more close1y later on. Leveled production is the opposite 
of the mass manufacturing philosophy based on the economics of scale. In leveled production 
one produces only the amount of product the customer wants evenly over a defined period of 
time. 
Toyota combats Muri and Mura by manufacturing on a long-term average demand and 
carrying a small amount of inventory to meet with any unforeseen increase in demand. This 
gives them a stable production proeess. Briefly put, one produces only the amount needed at 
the time needed. Successfulleveled production is a prerequisite for the next component ofthe 
foundation, Stable and standardized proeesses. Before we discuss Stable and standardized 
proeesses however I would like to introduee the reader to Kanban. 
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I wish to pay special attention to kanban as this is the glue that holds the Toyota Production 
System, TPS, together and is also the single most important factor for achieving leveled 
production. 
Taiichi Ohno got the idea for Kanban while studying the American sup enn arket and refined it 
to suit the needs of Toyota. Kanban is the operating system of the Toyota Production System. 
Roughly translated from Japanese Kanban means "signal" or "a card you can see and touch". 
The card, (fig. 16) carries all the necessary bits ofinfonnation on it. 
"The Toyota Production System is the production method and Kanban is the 
way it is managed" Ohno (1988: 33) 
Kanban is also the way to achieve Just -In-Time and is the autonomic nerve of the production 
line. 
PartHumbet 
fig. 16 examples of Kanban cm'ds. (www.velaction.com/kanban-card) 
The infonnation can be divided into three categories. 
1. Production infonnation 
2. Transfer infonnation 
3. Pick up infonnation. 
Theyall supply the following infonnation. What is to be delivered (production infonnation), 
in what quantity it is to be delivered (production infonnation), when it is to be delivered 
(transfer infonnation), how it is to be delivered (transfer infonnation), where it is to be 
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delivered (pick up information), by who it is to be delivered (pick up information), to whom it 
is to be delivered (pick up information). 
In an ideallean situation this information will not only be carried vertically and horizontally 
within the organization but also between the organization and its outside partners or co-
operating firms, feg suppliers. 
In short a kanban system signals the authorization to move material or product from the 
supplying location to the consuming location. It can also be used to signal the authorization to 
produce additional product. 
There are two standard types ofkanban cards used in a basic kanban system. They are the 
withdrawal kanban card and the production kanban card. 
• Withdrawal Kanban: 
The withdrawal kanban specifies the kind and quantity of the component which the 
manufacturing process should withdraw fr'om a preceding process. The withdrawal kanban 
identifies the location in the previous pro cess where the components can be withdrawn 
fr·om. 
• Production Kanban: 
The production kanban is sometimes called an in-process Kanban. This type ofkanban card 
specifies the kind and quantity of the component which the preceding process must produce. 
The card will identify the pmi to be produced and the location where it must be placed. 
It is important to note that a kanban system does not necessarily ne ed to use visual cards only. 
An empty shelf or container can be used as a signal for a refill instead of a card if the situation 




Puns tteft'! 'A' 
Fig. 17 simple example of kanban using an empty shelf as a signal 
Here the downstream operator removes a part A necessary for his process step. The upstream 
operator who supplies the downstream process step sees one empty spot on the shelf. This is a 
signal or kanban for the upstream operator to replenish the shelf with one part A, no more no 
less. Here there is no necessity for a physical card as the signal is visual. 
So how does Kanban work? I will explain how basic kanban works with a simple example. 
Imagine a factory manufacturing some fonn of mechanical product. The finished product 
requires that two parts be put together at the factory. Let's call them Part A and Part B. 
The manufacturing process consists ofthree "stages": The receiving area where parts A and B 
are received and stored, the "assembly" area where parts A and Bare put together to fonn the 
device and the shipping area, where the devices are shipped off to various stores for sale. 
The two parts are stored in separate bins. The completed devices are placed on pallets. When 
a pallet is shipped to a store, an empty pallet is retumed to the worker's area. 
The factory might operate something like this: 
The factory worker starts by getting one of Part A and one of Part B from their respective 
bins. They assemble one device. The device is then placed on a p all et. When the pallet is full 
it goes to the shipping area. 
When a store needs more products, the pallet is shipped to the store. The pallet of completed 
product stays in the shipping area until it is shipped. If there is a pallet in the shipping area, 
the worker knows not to make any more products. 
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The Kanban signal here is not a card but an empty pallet in the shipping area. If it is empty, 
more of the product must be made. If it is full, no more of the product will be made. This is 
the Kanban between the organization and the external customer. This is the easiest type of 
Kanban where no cards need to be filled in. 
The most important Kanban is however the Kanban between intern al customers, i.e. between 
the different pro cess steps. This is important because there usually are many process steps and 
severai production lines. The savings will be much greater than with just the Kanban between 
the customer and the finished product. Let us take a look at a simple intern al set up. 
In the bins for Part A and Part B there is a label (the Kanban card). This card informs workers 
that when the level of parts drops be10w a certain defined leve1, more should be ordered. 
Obviously, in a high volume factory there might be 20 assembling stations and 30 pallets. 
Each individual system must be continually modified to find the exact right leve1 for the 
kanban to signal that an action is required. 
Let us look at a more concrete example. Let's say one of the components needed to make the 
product is a 20cm stem-bolt and it arrives on pallets. There are 100 stem-bolts on a pall et. 
When the pallet is empty, the operator assembling the product takes a Kanban card that was 
attached to the pallet and sends it to the stem-bolt manufacturing area. Another pallet of stem-
bolts is then manufactured and sent to the assembler. A new pallet of stem-bolts is not made 
until a card is received. This is Kanban, in its simplest form. 
A more realistic example would probably involve at least two pallets. The product assembler 
would start working from the second pallet while new stem-bolts were being made to refill the 
first pallet. In a high volume manufacturing facility, each product assembly station might 
empty a pallet of stem-bolts in just a few minutes, and there could be 15 or 20 product 
assembly stations. Thus there would be a continual flow of cards going back to the stem-bolt 
manufacturing area that would cause a continual flow of pallets of stem-bolts to be sent to the 
assembly stations. 
Kanban supports the "pull" type ofproduction system. In fact "pull" is hardly possible 
without kanban. As one can see here the number of stem-bolts that are made depends on the 
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customer demand--in other words the number of cards received by the stem-bolt 
manufacturing area. 
Systems other than cards may be used. For example, the empty pallets may be returned to the 
stem-bolt manufacturing area. Each empty pallet received indicates a need to manufacture 100 
more stem-bolts. For other types of components, bins, boxes or cages might be used instead of 
pallets. Or components might be stored on shelves in the widget assembly area. When a shelf 
became empty that signals that more components need to be manufactured and the shelf 
refilled. 
In Kanban the method of handling the components is flexible, and depends on the needs of the 
manufacturing process. 
Kanban can also operate like a supermarket. A small stock of every component needed to 
make a product can be stored in a specific location with a fixed space allocation for each 
component. That is each component having its own designated space. The assemblers come to 
the "supermarket" and select the components they need. As each component is removed from 
the shelf, a message is sent to a "regional warehouse" or component manufacturing facility, 
requesting that the component be replaced. The "supermarket" might then receive a daily 
shipment of replacement components, exactly replacing those that were used. 
If one just changes the term "supermarket" to "warehouse" we have our manufacturing 
example. 
This "supermarket" model is different from the first Kanban example in that it would be used 
when components are manufactured in facilities that are distant from the assembly plant. 
Instead of mo ving around small quantities of components, larger quantities are shipped once a 
day to the centralized warehouse. 
Kanban results in a production system that is highly responsive to customers. In the above 
examples, production varies dep ending on customer demand. And as the product demand 
varies, so will the internal demand for components. Instead of trying to anticipate the future 
(predicting the future is difficult), Kanban reacts to the immediate needs eliminating 
expensive stockpiling. 
Obviously Kanban is directly associated with Just-In-Time (JIT) delivery. However, Kanban 
is not another name for just-in-time delivery. It is a part of a larger JIT system. There is more 
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to managing a JIT system than just Kanban and there is more to Kanban than just inventory 
management. I cannot go into the complete management of a JIT system. That in itself could 
be the topic of another paper. It suffices to say that for the whole JIT system to work one has 
to also consider systems for such things as total maintenance, training, hiring etc. Toyota has 
excellent processes for these areas 
Kanban, while incredibly efficient, and requiring less predictive modeling than many other 
organizational techniques like MRP, requires a firm leadership commitment. Kanban also 
highlights the primary goal ofwaste elimination. Using kanban immediately exposes waste, 
which generates creative study, ideas and improvements. 
"It is not an overstatement to say that Kanban controls the flow of goods at Toyota. It 
controls the production of a company exceeding $ 4.8 billion a year" Ohno (1988: 29) 
This was the 1988 figure, I am sure the production today is higher 
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The challenge is to get the processes from chaotic to stable and precise. This is only possible 
by eliminating all waste from the processes. As Spear & Bowen (1999) state Toyota does this 
by adhering to their four rules. 
1. How people work 
2. How people connect. Internal customer supplier relationships 
3. How the production line is constructed. Flow of the product from start to finish 
4. How to improve. The system for continuous improvement of people and processes. 
To start eliminating waste we must have standardized work. Every one carrying out a task 
must do it in exactly the same way. The work in process moves from one process step to the 
next. This hand over is strictly regimented and is unambiguous. The flow of the product from 
raw material to finished product is made as simple and as direct as possible. This brings 
stability to the processes. Then the pro cess es are continuously improved until they are not 
only stable but precise. This continuous improvement of the processes also improves the 
problem solving skills of the people. I will now give a brief description of the four rules. 
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The Toyota Production System is just that, a system. A system does not work itself. The most 
important component in the system is the people who run it. They are important because only 
the people have the intelligence and knowledge to continuously IMPROVE the system. 
Their intelleet and skills are the most important property and asset of any company. Their 
knowledge and expertise is mostly in their brains and never written down. It would be 
impossible to do so in a dynamic and changing manufacturing system. 
This tacit knowledge is captured in four basic rules described by Spear & Brown (1999) as the 
DNA ofTPS. Faithful adherence to these tools ensures operational stability, Standard work 
and a scientific, sustainable continuous improvement. As one can see from the TPS house 
these are elements from the foundation and contents ofthe house itself. Following the rules 
contributes to every aspect of TPS not only the foundation but to the two pillars and also to 
choosing and using of all the pertinent tools ofTPS. 
Rule # 1 - How people work 
AS Spear & Brown (1999) state, Toyotas managers recognize that the "DEVIL IS IN THE 
DETAIL" that's why theyensure that all work i.e. each individual task is highly specified as 
to content. Rule #1 is one of the most important and least understood of the rules. At Toyota, 
each activity is specified with detailed instructions. For example, when assemblers install 
seats with four bolts, the bolts are inserted and tightened in a precise sequence to a precise 
torque. Every worker instalIs them in the same way, every time. 
This regimentation increases the linkage between the way work is done and the results. That 
is the traceability between the individual' s activity and its result. If everyone worked in 
different ways, the link would be broken or obscure and there would be no traceability 
between the work and the result. Such regimental exactness is applied to the work, not only 
to the repetitive motions of the production workers but to the activities of all people regardless 
of their functional specialty or hierarchical role. How do we reconcile such regimented work 
with the experimentation and concem for individuals that is supposed to be a part of the 
system? The answer is that while individual workers cannot vary the process, teams are 
required to, actively analyze, experiment, change and improve the process. This improvement 
process is carried out in a scientific manner according to rule 4. Rule # l seems simple 
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enough but in reality most managers outside of Toyota and its partners do not take this 
approach to work design and execution even when they think they do. 
Rule # 2 - How people connect 
Whi1e the first ru1e describes how each person performs his or her individual task the second 
ru1e describes how they connect with each other. Simp1y put the ru1e describes the 
re1ationship between internal supp1iers and internal customers. That is, how the work of one 
individual or earlier process step is handed over to the next individual or process step for 
further work as the material progresses down through the production line. These connections 
have to be standardized and direct. They must unambiguous1y specify the peop1e invo1ved, the 
form and quantity of the goods and/or services to be provided, the way requests are made by 
each customer (Kanban) and the time at which the requests shou1d be met. These connections 
must have a c1ear yes/no signal there is no room for misunderstanding or ambiguity. 
This imp1icit ru1e gave rise to Kanban, Direct Link, Super markets and other 1ean scheduling 
systems or too1s. It tells us that every operation shou1d send its products to subsequent 
"customers" direct1y using methods and algorithms that are c1ear and precise. It prec1udes 
separate warehouses and separate peop1e or departments whose on1y function is inventory 
management. As aresult there are no gray zones when deciding who provides what to whom 
and when. 
Rule # 3 - How the production line is constructed 
Every product and service trave1s a single, simple and direct flow path. There are no forks and 
100ps to convolute the flow ofany of Toyota's supply chains. Toyota's U-shaped work-cells 
are the ultimate manifestation ofthis ru1e. It means that every piece offinished product has 
been through the same equipment and precise1y the same process. It improves consistency and 
traceabi1ity, makes troub1e-shooting easier and simp1ifies material handling and schedu1ing. 
The path does not change un1ess the production line is express1y changed. The material trave1s 
or is transported a10ng the most direct and simplest route possib1e from pro cess step to 
proeess step. 
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Rule # 4 - How to improve 
Workers at the lowest feasible level, guided by a teacher (Sensei), improve their own work 
processes using scientific methods. This is the basis for continuous improvement or any kind 
of change at Toyota. Rule #4 ties closely with Rule #1. It prevents Work Instructions from 
becoming moribund memorials rather than living guides. It ensures that these work 
instructions are dynamic. It enlists the entire workforce in the improvement (Kaizan) efforts. 
Identifying a problem is only the first step. For people to consistently make effective changes 
they must know how to change and who is responsible for making the changes. They must 
also ensure that everyone leams from the change. Every improvement is regarded as a 
leaming experience. This is where the rule for improvement comes in. Rule # 4 stipulates that 
all improvements must be carried out in accordance with Toyota's scientific method under the 
guidance of a teacher and at the lowest possible organizationallevel. So who does the 
improvement? Front line workers make the improvements to their jobs and their supervisors 
provide direction and assistance as teachers. 
We can in summary say that the first 3 rules are about ensuring quality work and its flow 
through the production line (see fig 17). The fourth rule is how to continuously improve in a 










Fig. 17 the 3 first ru/es 
flow is organized 
Rl1lE #1 
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• TAKT TIME 
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Rule 4 Continuous improvement 
oOn the shop floor 
·With the people involved 
o Led by a coach 
oScientific and defined 
omelhods 
Fig. 18 Rute 4 Scientific way for Continuous improvement 
At Toyota nothing is changed unless the change is necessary and leads to an improvement that 
reduces the costs, improves quality or HSE (Health Safety Environment). All improvements 
are arrived at by using the scientific method based on facts, data and analysis. 
The 4th rule basically stipulates that any improvements must be made in accordance with the 
scientific method. This rule teaches people how to improve and how to sustain improvements 
made. It is about how everyone can leam not only from personal experience but from the 
experience of others. As we mentioned earlier these four rules lead to sustainable continuous 
improvement that eliminates waste and finally to the end result of stable and precise processes 
leading to minimal production costs and greater profits. 
Continuous improvement is the driving force of TPS. A culture and methodology for 
sustainable continuous improvement is what keeps Toyota ahead of every other 
manufacturing company. Every organization improves but the sustainable almost etemal 
continuous improvement that is needed for true lean manufacturing has not been achieved by 
many. Usually companies improve by fits and starts and improvements are only thought of 
when things go bad or in times of slow growth. In a lean organization the improvement is 
continuous regardless. This improvement is used to constantly reduce waste, and cut costs by 
incessantly optimize all the processes in the organization. Figure 19 sums up the chapter 
rather well 
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Basically what we can glean from figure 19 is that stable and precise processes are achieved 
through elimination of waste. This waste elimination is achieved by setting up the first three 
rules and continuously improving them using the forth rule. The figure does not describe the 
nitty-gritty details ofhow this is done it is just an overview ofhow the system is set up to 
work. It is worth noting that the PDCA circle or the Deming circle plays a central role in the 
system along with Toyota's extremely effective method ofreporting, the A3 report. This is 
however outside the scope of this thesis and there is some good literature available for any 
reader who is interested in del ving deeper into the A3 and PDCA methodology. 
11.5, TPS 
Raving touched on the subject of stable processes and continuous improvement I feel it would 
be remiss ofme not to describe the main goal or one could even say the greatest result ofTPS. 
It is the elimination ofwaste. It is basically through the elimination ofwaste that Toyota 
keeps their processes stable, standardized and optimized. 
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Toyota believes that profits increased not by trying to transfer the costs ofinefficient 
production over to the customer but by eliminating unnecessary waste in the production 
process and thereby reducing the cost of production to a minimum. 
One can say that; "Lean rneans eliminating waste" 
Toyota uses this formula; 
Profit = Price - Costs + Volurne 
The company has three choices to increase profit. 
1. Increase the price 
2. Increase the volume 
3. Reduce costs 
Price 
In a highly competitive industry like the automobile industry Toyota is convinced that they 
cannot dictate the price. The customer has a myriad of choices regarding makes models and 
prices. 
Volurne 
The volume (amount ofproduct sold) is controlled by the market 
Costs 
The on ly thing a company really has controlover are its internal costs, the costs of 
production. Note that when Toyota says production they do not only mean the manufacturing 
costs on the shop floor. They mean the costs ofthe whole company as a whole and this 
includes the administrative costs, maintenance costs, R&D costs etc. Toyota goes so far as to 
include the costs oftheir suppliers. This has led to Toyota going in and helping their preferred 
suppliers to be Lean as well. Toyota has identified two major causes ofwaste and eight major 
types of waste. 
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The two major causes of waste 
4. Mura - un even production 
5. Muri - overwork 
Lead to 
6. Muda - waste 
Mura: This word means "unevenness". It applies to everything. This word embodies the 
concept of JIT, or Just-In-Time. Ifwe have unevenness, we are batching. We are not making 
the right parts, in the right quantities, at the right time. The concept of "takt" time is used to 
create a pace for peop1e to work to. "Takt" is a German word, just to make it more confusing, 
meaning pace or beat. The takt time is the pace of customer demand which in turn dictates the 
pace of production. If we bui1d to demand, we avoid unevenness in our work. We are making 
the most efficient use of peop1e, materials, and machines avai1ab1e. 
Muri. This word means "heavy burden". This word embodies the concepts of standard work. 
When we observe the job, we see what is actually happening from the viewpoint ofthe 
worker. We see the potentia1 safety issues, the ergonomi c issues, the searching for too1s, the 
walking for he1p, the waiting for approvals, etc. In other words, our current system, as we 
designed it, is a burden for our customers, the operator. All improvement is done for the 
operators in order to reduce the burden. The 1ean too1s of standard work he1p us improve the 
job for operators, whi1e improving the process for our qua1ity, cost, de1ivery and safety 
objectives. 
Muda. This word means "wastefu1ness". It applies to everything that is non-va1ue adding. It 
seems Kiichiro Toyoda and Taiichi Ohno were ab1e to classify waste into 8 categories 
common1y seen on the shop floor, but most importantly in the context of the conditions ofthat 
time. For them, they faced a small market controlled by the government, where materials, 
machines, money and peop1e were a scarcity. Wastefu1ness was not an option. They found 
that inventories that were too big hurt the abi1ity for cash to flow through the business, where 
it was needed, when it was needed. (See fig 20) 
This was true for the American war production story during WWII as well and Toyota 1earned 
a lot from the U.S by studying how the War Production Office controlled stee1, copper, 
peop1e, equipment and even entire factories. Profits were slim. Wastefu1ness, in the form of 
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large stockpiles of material inventories, was not an option during critical war production and 
is not an option today in any highly competitive business enviromnent. 
How do es Toyota define work and waste? Work that is needed is regarded as real work. All 
other work is regarded as waste. 
Present capacity = work + waste 
Taiichi Ohno, founder of TPS, said it very succinctly: 
"All we are doing is looking at the time line from the moment the customer gives us an 
order to the point we collect the cash, and we are reducing that time line by removing 
the non-value -added wastes " Ohno (1988: xi) 
(Fig. 20) Ohno 's time line Ohno (1988: xi) 
The result is a lean process that delivers high quality products to the customer at a low cost, 
on time and allows Toyota to get paid without holding enormous amounts of inventory. 
Similar lean processes extend through all of Toyota, from product development to sales to 
business support functions. 
Ohno attached a very particular meaning to non-value-added waste. It had nothing to do with 
running labor and equipment as hard as possible. It had everything to do with the manner in 
which raw material is transfonned into asaleable commodity, i.e. production. 
Lean is about identifying activities that add value to raw materials getting rid of everything 
else. One has to leam to map the value stream of the raw material moving through the 
production process that turns it into a finished product that the customer is willing to pay for. 
This is a radically different approach from the mass production thinking of merely 
identifying, enumerating and eliminating the wasted time and effort in the existing production 
system. 
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True effieieney eomes when one produees zero waste and brings the pereentage of value 
adding work to 100 pereent. The preliminary step ofTPS is to identify waste eompletely. 
Eliminating these wastes will improve the operating effieieney by a very large margin. To do 
this we must only make the quantity needed thereby releasing extra manpower. It is 
management' s responsibility to identify waste, eliminate it and utilize the released exeess 
manpower effeetively. 
Hiring people when business is good and produetion is high just to lay them off when 
reeession hits is a very bad praetiee. On the other hand eliminating wasteful and meaningless 
jobs enhanees the value ofwork for workers. Everyone'sjob is needed and important. 
Toyota has identified what they think are the eight (8) primary wastes (Muda) that result from 
Mura and Muri (fig. 22) 
The 8 primary ,,,astes G Muda, Waste 
Fig. 22 the eight p rim my wastes according to Toyota 
When thinking about the absolute elimination of waste one should however keep two points 
in mind. 
1. Improving effieieney only makes sense when it is tied to eost reduetion. To aehieve 
this we have to start produeing only the things we need using minimum manpower. 
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2. Look at the efficiency of each operator, each department and/or line, then the 
efficiency of the whole plant (all departments and/or lines). Efficiency must be 
improved at each step at the same time for the whole plant. One has to be careful that 
the improvement in one department or line does not lead to problems in another 
department or line. 
The Philosophy and strategy of systematically eliminating waste results in the organization 
being able to optimize all its processes. This means that an organization gradually brings all 
its processes from a state of chaos where nothing is predictable to a state of stability and 
precision whereby the organization is able to predict the output and the resources needed to 
ensure that the outcome is in accordance with given specifications. This means the best 
possible quality with no waste. This is the end result ofTPS. (See fig 22) and enables Toyota 
to dispense with end product quality control which is a very costly process. Quality is built 
into the process. (The Jidoka pillar in TPS) The stable and precise process gives operational 
stability (Heijunka) which is a major part ofthe foundation ofTPS. 
Fmm 
Chaos 








In sum waste reduction sounds easy but there is much to it. It cannot be accomplished by 
making one pass over your operation to seek and destroy waste. This is not the purpose either. 
The basis ofwaste reduction is to create a connected value stream in which all team associates 
are being forced to think, solve problems and eliminate waste. The initial process of mo ving 
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through the continuous improvement cycle to achieve system wide stability and flow can take 
years of effort. 
It is helpful when trying to implement lean to think about the relationship between one piece 
flow and waste reduction in the context of a broader model. This is the waste reduction model 
(fig. 23). 
Rather that blindly leaping into implementing whatever tools are sugge sted for flow and pull 
by some "Lean" consultant it is imperative that an organization first understands the purpose. 
This model emphasizes the relationship between the primary principle of Lean which is the 
identification and elimination ofwaste and the method for achieving that objective which is to 
reduce the batch size to move towards continuous flow. The creation of continuous flow is 
often thought to be a primary objective when creating a lean proeess, but in reality, the 
creation of continuous flow is designed to drive waste from any operation. Waste elimination 
is the primary objective. 
Real success comes from an improvement proeess for identifying waste - understanding the 
root cause of the waste and putting into place countermeasures to eliminate the root cause. 
Unfortunately this is much more difficult than just installing a piece of software or some kind 
of automation. This knowledge and understanding of continuous improvement is also what, 
the earlier mentioned, rule # 4 is all about. 
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Performanee measures 
Reduced lead time 
Lean Tools 
Kauban, SupermaIkets 
De:filled FIFO laues 
Control method 
Utilize visual controls )--, 









Problems are exposed 
quickly and they are critical 
n. 
Effect 
Problems mustthen be 
corrected quicldy 
Fig. 22 Toyota 's Waste reduction model Liker (2006:83) 
Total systcmcost is 
rcduccd 
There has been a great deal of misunderstanding about visual management. It has been 
assumed that visual management was achieved by upper management walking around the 
shop floor or by hanging up all kinds of shadow boards and other visual aids. 
It is this author's opinion that the word management has automatically led to people to 
assume that visual management had something to do with managers. In this case management 
means the management of the proeesses by the people responsible for them. 
All proeesses at Toyota have a defined nonnal situation where everything is running as it 
should, all other situations are abnonnal and corrections have to be undertaken. This is 
standardization. The purpose of visual management is to make visible when a proeess is 
running nonnally or if an abnonnal situation has occurred. Visual management motivates 
people and encourages continuous improvement. 
The problem usually is that organizations, not understanding the true purpose ofvisualization, 
just put up a myriad of shadow boards and other infonnation about production. These serve 
no purpose. Random visualization will yield random results and unintended consequences. 
The countenneasure is to make sure each visual artifact has a clear and specific purpose. To 
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make sure the visua1 boards are usefu1 and attain their intended purpose, Dave Logozzo 
proposes that an organization shou1d ask these three simple questions. 
1. What is the purpose? 
2. Who is it for? 
3. How often do you use and/or respond to indications of abnormality - what is your 
PDCApu1se? 
Dave Logozzo as quoted by John Shook Shook 
(http://www.lean.org/shook/DisplayObject.cjm?o=2095) 
To obtain effective visua1 management arrange the flow ofwork so that problems are 
high1ighted as they arise, enab1ing and encouraging individua1s and teams to tack1e them right 
away. All visualization shou1d support this. 
It can be said that how we arrange the physica1 environment to represent and optimize the 
way we want to work and ensuring that our way of thinking about work is embodied in the 
way we configure our physica1 environment, are methods to he1p us tap into natura1 human 
motivations. 
Visua1 management and how it works are illustrated in the following examp1e described, in an 
e-1etter, by John Shook who became Toyota's first American manager in Japan. 
"A young woman was do ing a quality check at the end of an assemb1y line of 
e1ectromechanica1 components. For two years she had been collecting the same qua1ity 
information. Performing a series of checks, she wou1d confirm that all connectors were 
firm1yattached, components all assemb1ed and in working order. As she found 
problems, she recorded them into a computer database, which was then compi1ed into 
a 1arger database. The database was reviewed, ana1yzed, and results fed back to the 
production group and others. 
Like this: 
~Ssy worQ + lEnd-af-line Inspecq + IData entrvl + IReview/Analysi~ + /Feedback to ASsy/Engineerin~ 
There was no direct connection between the workers making the errors and the 
inspector finding the errors, and the information that was eventually shared followed a 
10ng and irregular time line. Management began 100king at the situation because of a 
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perceived "lack ofmotivation" in the workers and inspectors. As plant management 
explored various means of increasing worker engagement and motivation, a quality 
engineer noticed the disconnect between the workers and feedback on their 
performance. Problems that could have been fixed right away to ok days and weeks to 
even surface, and the time required for errors to be corrected could take much longer. 
The engineer wanted to fix his technical problem. 
It was the woman doing the inspecting who made the suggestion. "How about," she 
offered, "instead of me just entering the error information into a database, I tick off 
each example as they occur on this unused white board?" She found it easy to simply 
make a quick note of each problem on the board, and to enter it later into the database. 
Like this: 
~ssy wor~+~nd-of-line Inspecq +Ifeedback to Ass~ + !Data entrv/ + IReview/Analysi~ + feedback to Engj 
What happened next was unplanned. The production line 1eader started noticing what 
she was doing. He was a little nervous, seeing the performance - the mistakes - of his 
team members displayed for all to see. The next suggestion was his. "How about," he 
offered, "if I bring my team over to take a look at the board at the end of each day, so 
we can see how we are doing?" 
What happened next was interesting. As the inspector and the workers looked at her 
board together, they started to talk about it. Tumed out, one of the workers who had 
been committing many of the mistakes mentioned that he had always had a problem 
with one of the connectors. The two ends of the connector were very small, his hands 
weren't, and the space he had to work in was very tight. A recurring problem had been 
uncovered, its cause identified, and the engineer was delighted as he knew he could 
make the situation better with a relatively easy engineering adjustment. Other 
problems that got rai sed were often even easier to remedy, often right on the spot. 
What motivates? 
What happened next was even more interesting. As the inspector and workers got to 
know each other better, instead ofwaiting until the end of the shift, they started 
stopping by during their lunch break. They could see how they had done so far in the 
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shift. Before long, the inspector and the team were engaged in a day-Iong exchange of 
how production was proceeding. Importantly, workers were struggling less while 
producing more and the inspector's very role in the proeess had changed dramatically. 
Management had sought to improve motivation and they did, but not at all in the way 
that they had expected. It tumed out that what was needed to increase motivation 
among the employees was more effective support in helping them to be successful and 
engaged in their work". Shook (http://wwl'v.lean.org/shookiDisplayObject.cjm?o=2095) 
The example above gives the reader an insight into what visual management is all about. 
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12. Toyota leadership 
The most important aspects oflean, its philosophy, systems and what brings it all together and 
both the Toyota way house and the TPS house have been described at some length. There is 
however one point the author would like to focus on. This is the importance that Toyota 
places on leadership. In the end it is Toyota's Leadership that makes it all happen. The fact, 
that the implementation and sustenance ofreallean manufacturing is totally dependent on the 
right leadership, has been vigorously expostulated by all the recognized authors on the subject 
and the research conducted for this thesis has also verified this fact pretty decisively. 
"The Toyota way is designed to eultivate leaders" Liker (2008: 318) 
This statement says it all. Without the right leadership and its commitment the Toyota Way 
will never stand. If one looks at principle 9 of the Toyota Way it states that Toyota aims to 
"Grow leaders who thoroughly understand the work, live the philosophy and teach it to 
others". 
The right leaders are absolutely imperative, not only to teach the philosophy and create the 
culture but they must also spre ad culture to all comers ofthe organization and the sustain it. 
As Liker & Hoseus (2008) so aptly put it, there are no self-maintaining systems or cultures. 
They tend to decay unless new energy is being fed into them. Leaders provide that energy. 
Growing their own leaders internally allows Toyota to maintain, develop and grow the culture 
that they live and work in. Toyota leaders are expected, in fact it is a large part oftheir job, 
not only to understand the Toyota philosophy but to also maintain and further evolve the 
Toyota culture. In addition they must truly live it and teach it to others. 
To be able to do this effectively, incur the necessary credibility and get the Toyota Culture 
into their DNA leader recruits have to be grown and developed from within Toyota. This is 
the reason that Toyota cannot easily recruit mass produced leaders. The guy waving his newly 
acquired MBA and applying for a managerial post at Toyota will not succeed Ifhe is to 
receive any consideration it will not be on account ofhis MBA. 
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"We believe in hands-on knowledge and not in someone who comes out of 
college and becomes the boss" Liker & Hoseus (2008:199) 
Toyota recruits people from within, who they feel have some naturalleadership abilities, and 
develops them to think and act in the Toyota Way every day. This process can take up to ten 
years. How many western or Scandinavian companies can boast ofthis process for recruiting 
and developing leaders? 
Many western companies do not distinguish between managers and leaders. One could say 
that you lead people and manage tasks you cannot, with any degree of appreciable success, 
manage people. 
"To better understand the difference between leadership and management we can 
draw on the example of the push - versus - pull systems. Traditionally top-down 
management is a push system in which workers are push ed to follow the orders of 
managers. Leadership on the other hand, is a pull system. Followers feel a magnetie 
pull that compels them to follow the direction of the leader. They seek the leader 's 
direction, believe in the leader, want to leam from the leader and relish the time they 
spend with the leader ". Liker & Hoseus (2008: 318) 
Leaders have power and effective leaders use their power to build a shared culture. No 
wonder Toyota is so successful. 
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13. Why companies fail- some major inhibitors 
Most attempts at implementing Lean are superficial and most implementation efforts dissolve 
and dissipate into failure sooner or later. The main cause of this failure, as has been described 
in all recognized literature and also verified by the research done in this thesis, is the totallack 
of skillful, dedicated leadership wholly committed to the philosophy of lean manufacturing 
and teaching the philosophy and resulting culture to the people. 
"To really ejJeet a ehange in the pro cess you must change the people. Peoples' belieft 
and values are rooted in their eultures" Liker & Hoseus (2008: 17) 
The author does not believe that Scandinavia has yet produced the kind of leaders that can 
accomplish this, at least not in the manufacturing industry. 
This lack of true committed leadership is the root cause of the failure of lean manufacturing in 
Norway. The effect ofthis is that uninitiated managers expect and depend on everybody else 
but themselves to implement lean. 
If one takes a look within the 4P model introduced in an earlier chapter one could say that 
most companies are dabbling at one level - the "Process" level and trying to improve results 




People and Partners 
Respecl Challenge and Grow 
tbem 
Philosophy 
Long term thinking 
Eliminating waste 
Fig. 23. Where most "Lean" companies are. Liker- 2004: 13) 
These companies will do little more than dabble on the surface of the lean ocean because the 
improvements they make will not have the heart and intelligence behind them to make them 
sustainable throughout the company or after a while even in the improved process. 
Norway has been exposed to lean for at least two decades. The basic concepts and tools are 
not new. The problem I believe is that Norwegian companies have embraced lean tools but do 
not understand what makes them work together in a system. Typically management, cheered 
on by equally ignorant lean consultants, adopts a few ofthese technical tools and usually 
struggles to go beyond the amateurish application of them to create a technical system, but 
they do not understand the power behind true lean: the continuous improvement culture 
needed to sustain the principles of the Toyota way. 
Another misunderstanding is continuous improvement. Leaders think that continuous 
improvement pertains only to the improvement ofthe production process. No, it pertains more 
so to the continuous improvement ofthe people which in turn results in the continuous 
improvement of the processes. 
The research results clearly show that the responsibility for the lack of success rests squarely 
on the shoulders ofleaders and management. They have not been willing to really study and 
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understand the philosophy behind lean so as to be able to teaeh the rest of the organization 
and lead the implementation themselves. 
Leaders and managers do not seem willing to undertake the radieal ehanges, in their 
philosophy and methods of management, neeessary for sueeessful implementation. They 
want to be managers and bosses, not teaehers. Too many leaders have the "wash me but 
don 't' get me wet" attitude when it eomes to implementing lean. This has led to the faet that 
implementation has been left in the hands of eonsultants. 
This situation has understandably been exploited to its fullest by eonsultants who have sold 
companies all kinds of "lean implementation paekages". Butjust like leaders and managers 
most eonsultants themselves do not understand the true philosophy oflean. Of eourse it is 
mueh easier to sell visible tangible results however short-lived they may be than to sell 
philosophies and tacit knowledge. 
The same mistakes have been made repeatedly. The emphasis has been on tools, tools and 
more tools. "Start with SS" has be en the mantra ofmost consultants. "Build teams". "Quality 
circles are the thing". "We need to start with Kanban", etc. etc. has been the cry. 
This "eherry pieking" from a myriad oflean tools, (fig. 24) taken out of eontext has been the 
bane of sueeessfullean implementation. True these tools may pluek some really low hanging 
fiuit but suecessful implementation oflean manufacturing itselfwill be eonspicuously absent. 
The improvements thus obtained will never be sustainable in the long term or even in the 
medium term. 
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Fig. 24 "Cheny picking" the tools 
Although these efforts have cost companies hundreds ofmillions of kroner they have not 
delivered anywhere near the expected results and certainly not lean manufacturing. This 
leaves leaders and managers extremely disappointed and skeptical to lean but at the same time 
not understanding that the reason for their lack of success is their own lack of understanding. 
Sadly they don 't understand that they don 't understand. Even more detrimental is the 
"BOHICAS" (Bend Over Here It Comes Again) syndrome it causes among the workers. 
Over the year workers have experienced numerous lean drives in their workplace initiated by 
new leaders coming in or by old leaders persuaded to try again by more convincing 
consultants who seIl a new twist to the old story. Some workers are so disillusioned that it will 
take a great amount of convincing before any new attempts can even get offthe ground. 
It is well worth noting that Ohno did not have consultants, post it notes, power point 
presentations or any of the modem technologies but yet he, together with the rest of Toyota's 
leadership, came up with and successfully implemented the most effective production system 
in world. The system is still surviving and continually improving after more than five 
decades. 
13.L 
5S is the classic way most consultants start off a lean implementation program. This is one of 
the major traps that many companies immediately fall into when they start their leanjoumey. 
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I would like to quote J effrey Liker on this. 
"Doing 5 Sis fun. Doing 5 Sis liberating. Anyone who has experienced the joy of 
cleaning the basement or ga rage, after a few years of garbage has accumulated knows 
the feeling. But 5 S is just one tool that enables stability that enables flow. The biggest 
mistake companies can make is to make 5 S into a stand- alone program with fanfare, 
rewards and signs everywhere. One could humorously say that ifyou stand in a place 
long enough you are apt to get a circle drawn where you are standing. There is nothing 
wrong about being diligent about 55. But in most cases onejust organizes and cleans up 
existing waste until it looks beautiful but well-organized and sparkling clean waste is still 
waste. GeIling bogged down in 5 S is an avoidance pattern - avoiding the real hard 
work of thinking about how to create flow and solve the real root cause problems 
inhibitingflow". Liker (2006: 64). Emphasis is added by author 
When tools are implemented as stand-alone programs any improvements experienced are 
local, one time happenings and sustainable gains and improvements are never achieved 
The first thing a company should be aware of when starting on the path to lean manufacturing 
is that SS is just another tool in the lean toolbox and certainly not the start of the lean 
manufacturing joumey. It is also a favorite alibi for managers. The plant looks really neat and 
tidy, something to impress the visiting eEO who is just as ignorant as everybody else. The 
waste is not removed just made to look pretty as J effrey Liker states above. 
Tools and techniques are not the key to Lean manufacturing: Rather the power behind Lean is 
the company's management commitment to continuously invest in its people and promote a 
culture of continuous improvement. 
Lean is not a result of the tools and technigues. The tools and technigues 
are a result of Lean. !! 
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14. Foundation for success 
There are no magic bullets. As we have already established lean is totally dependent on a 
"new" management philosophy based on completely dedicated and committed leaders coded 
with the DNA ofthe company philosophy, establishing and sustaining a company culture, 
living and teaching it to all employees. 
Assuming that this critical criterion is met, the first major step is for these dedicated leaders to 
honestly define why the company exists. What is your company's true purpose? It's a tough 
question to answer with absolute honesty. 
If you are convinced that your companyexists simply to make money then all you have to do 
is to put a big dollar sign on a poster for the employees and managers to see and forget all 
about elaborate mission statements and philosophies. If there is something more than that you 
should consider carefully and honestly what the company is trying to achieve both internally 
and externally. The company has internal and external stake holders. The internal 
stakeholders are the employees. The external stakeholders are the owners/investors, society, 
the authorities, suppliers, customers etc. Y ou have to consider what you are trying to build for 
your intern al stakeholders and what impact you are trying to have on the outside world. This 
was the philosophy and starting point for Toyota. 
A true lean organization is built on a two part mission. One part is about people the other part 
is about business. Figure 3 (chapter 3.1) represents company purpose as a matrix combining 
internal and external goals as they relate to people and business. It inc1udes simple statements 
based on Toyota's purpose and shows both the short-term goal and the longer term purpose of 
the company. 
The short term goals for each of the four cells is what every company wants. Capable intern al 
processes, capable people who can do the work, capable partners who can do their jobs and 
they want to make money. That's pretty straight forward. The great challenge is getting a 
sincere commitment from top management to long term thinking even at the expense of short 
term gains. Liker - (2006) 
105 
The author is not in any way propagating copying Toyota's philosophy as is. In fact this will 
not get you to lean. Bach company must develop its own philosophy. So the hard work still 
remains. This is why you need the type of leaders described above. But you do not have to 




Although hundre ds of Norwegian companies have started on the "leanjoumey" none seem to 
arrive at the end station which is a sustainable and credible lean manufacturing organization. 
In today's highly competitive world optimizing ones proeesses is ofparamount importance to 
an organization's survival especially during times ofreeession or low growth. 
This thesis sets out to investigate and identify the necessary requirernents to ensure the 
success oflean implementation in Norwegian companies and to establish the reasons for the 
thousands of failed attempts that have fallen far short of successful irnplementation and have 
never come even close to duplicating Toyota's enormous success. 
The empirical data gathered for the research was obtained using the survey method. A twenty 
point questionnaire was distributed arnong the respondents and a series of interviews were 
also conducted. The questionnaire and the interview questions were based on a thorough 
review ofliterature authored by the world's foremost experts on Toyota, its philosophy, 
culture and methodology. 
The purpose of the survey was to map what people who had been directly involved in 
implementing lean in Norway saw as the reasons for failure. The people themselves came 
from three categories, 1) Leaders and mangers, 2) Supervisors operators and "1ean facilitators, 
3) Lean consultants. These categories represent management, the shop-floor and the outside 
interests. 
Looking at the six highest scoring statements (on a scale of 1 - 10) in the questionnaire 
presented in table 5 we see that, the first place goes to "Management do es not understand the 
philosophy of Lean or its core concepts" with 9.5 followed by "Management uninvolved" 
with 9.3, while third place goes to "Management not competent enough to be teachers 
(sensei)" being given 9.2. Fourth place goes to "No real organizational change -lean is just 
something to try when people are not busy working getting" with 9.1, while "There is no 
consistency ofleadership" also eams 9.1 and lastly "Management wants everyone else to 
change but is unwilling to change itself' scoring 9. 
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Summarizing the respons es to the interviews one can again see that respons es like, top leaders 
were not involved other than in giving speeches and telling us lean was important, or that 
there was never any company philosophy communicated and nobody ever mentioned 
philosophy or culture, leaders were only interested in the results of the improvement work and 
these results were expected to come as quicklyas possible are very revealing as to what the 
people were missing. 
Furthermore the training and development of people was also missing and is confirm ed by the 
statement there was no formal training program or development program for the people. The 
dissatisfaction and frustration with consultants is illustrated in the statement, the leaders 
depended on the consultants for everything and that the operators saw no advantage to all the 
shadow boards and other information boards they had hung up. This also confirms the "cherry 
picking" mentioned in chapter thirteen. Finally we have the complaint that people spent more 
time in meetings than in do ing actual work. 
The results of the research can be synthesized into three major criteria that have to be met if 
one wants to ensure a successful transition to lean. 
These are 1) A company philosophy that is communicated to and thoroughly understood by 
all. 2) Top leaders committed to living and teaching the company philosophy and culture 
throughout the company. 3) A company culture that promotes respect for people and their 
continuous improvement (leaming organization). 
The question then is does the literature review confirm the findings of the research? 
Discussing the philosophy of training and development at Toyota the former president of 
Toyota in North America stated that every leader at Toyota must be a teacher. Liker & Meier 
(2007) 
Chapter 9.1 ofthis thesis describes Toyota's 14 principles. A close study and analysis ofthese 
principles tend to confirm the findings of the research. 
Principle one lays company philosophy down as the foundation of lean. Principle nine 
categorically states that a company should grow leaders who thoroughly understand the work, 
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live the philosophy and teach it to others. Principles ten, eleven and fourteen handle respect 
for people. There is however overlap between the fourteen principles but this only strengthens 
them and interconnects them in such a manner so that one cannot leave out any ofthem 
without detrimental effects to another. 
The company philosophy when it is lived and taught by leaders results in a common company 
culture. 
CIo se study ofthe Toyota way house in figure 2, The Toyota production System house in 
figure in figure 13 and the Toyota way 2001 house in figure 4 all illustrate that the philosophy 
and culture are built into the foundation and/or the walls. 
The propagation of the philosophy is not possible without the total commitment ofleaders 
who live and teach the philosophy thereby establishing a common culture throughout the 
organization. What true management commitment involves is clearly illustrated in figure 1. 
One can thus conclude that the literature study also emphatically confirms that the three 
critical criteria revealed by the research are the foundation for a successful transition to lean 
manufacturing. 
While the literature review confirms the findings of the research, the results of the research 
also clearly indicate that the vast majority ofleaders are unaware of the importance or even 
the existence ofthese criteria and consequently do not make any attempt to meet them. 
It is obvious that it is this lack ofknowledge and understanding, ofwhat lean demands ofits 
leaders, that is the primary reason for failure. 
This ignorance of the necessary criteria results in leaders, attempting a transition to lean, 
being incapable ofbehaving as lean leaders should. They just don't know how. This is the 
root cause of failure. Its effect is that these leaders also fail to recognize or understand the 
other many critical factors that are necessary for the successful implementation. 
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This leaves such leaders in the hands of, in many cases, equally ignorant consultants who 
prolonging their engagement with the company for as long as possible by "cherry picking" 
tools from the lean toolbox. 
The implications of this study are that the way in which companies attempt to implement lean 
has to be radically revised. 
It is imperative that leaders realize and take into account the fact that in reality it is they who 
have to lead the transition by being true and credible lean leaders. This credibility has to be 
eamed by living and teaching the lean way. Leaders cannot buy themselves an alibi by hiring 
lean consultants, pointing out a "lean facilitator" chosen from amongst the supervisors or 
operators and leaving the implementation of lean in their hands. 
The leaders of any company that really wants to implement lean and approach the level of 
success enjoyed by Toyota have to radically change their thinking. They have to meet the 
criteria indentified in this study to lay the foundation for a successful transition. If this is 
accomplished and the company can en sure consistency ofleadership then it is well on its way. 
It is not sufficient for leaders, exited by the prospects of great profit margins promised by 
implementing lean manufacturing, to hire a few consultants, lean back and wait for it to 
happen. The success of implementation lies squarely on the shoulders of the leaders. 
l A brief 
A company can start with a dedicated set ofleaders who are willing to put in the time and 
effort necessary to really understand the philosophy oflean. Their first task would then be to 
define the purpose oftheir own company and put in the necessary work to establish a 
company philosophy that supports this purpose. The leaders then have to live and teach this 
philosophy throughout the organization and create a cornmon company culture in keeping 
with the philosophy. These leaders should put in the necessary legwork to really go and talk to 
the people, get their feedback and identify the gap between the culture ne ed ed to attain the 
purpose of the company and the current company culture. This gap has to be closed or 
narrowed as much as possible. Closing that gap is a task that can only be accomplished by 
leaders. 
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Respect for the team members (employees) should be of paramount importance. Only people 
can solve problems and optimize proeesses. With this in mind leaders should ensure the 
continuous improvement of all team members. Leaders and mangers should shrug off the 
need to be boss and put on the mantel ofteacher and guide. A training program that has 
proven its worth both in wartime USA and at Toyota is the "Training Within Industry" (TWI) 
program described earlier in this thesis. 
The next step would be to ensure the consistency of leadership by recruiting leaders from 
within the company, recruits who are saturated with the DNA of the company philosophy and 
culture. If a company can come thus far then they will be well on the way to becoming a true 
lean organization. 
153, LimitatioHs 
The study does not include considerations to culture. Spear and Bowen (1999) categorically 
state that culture is not an obstacle and point to the fact that the Toyota way is just as 
successful in North Ameriea as in Japan. However it may be wise to examine the culture of 
the environment one is implementing lean in. Further research spanning over a wider range of 
cultural contingeneies such as, would certain words or terminology be acceptable in that 
particular environment?, the ethnic mix of the work force in the environment etc. Research 
should also be carried out to identify the possible existence of legal barriers to methods used 
in Japan and even in the USA that may not be allowed in Norway. 
Although the study has no limitations with regard to sphere of application, the parti ei pants of 
the survey came mainly from the manufacturing industry with the exception of some of the 
consultants who had experience from service industries. 
l Future resean:h 
There is one area that is of great interest for future research. As mentioned in the thesis, 
kanban is the glue that holds TPS together. It has up till now mostly been a manual system 
using visual cards, empty shelves etc. Nowadays implementations of any kind without 
information and communications technologies are becoming increasingly difficult. Research 
conducted on how Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) software can be used to enhance the 
kanban methodology would be of great interest. This would be especially advantageous in 
very high volurne, diversified product environments. 
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The word kanban is Japanese. Roughly translated, it means "card you can see." 
Toyota uses Kanban as a visual signal that to trigger an action, i.e. to produce a defines 
quantity of product 
Kaizen: 
Kaizen (pronounced ki-zen) is a Japanese word that means a change for the better. Kaizen is 
commonly us ed in the lean context to represent continuous improvement. Kaizen kan also be 
used to label a group of methods that improve work processes. 
Jidoka: 
In lean or TPS jidoka is defined by Toyota as automation or machines with a certain amount 
ofhuman intelligence. Toyota calls this autonomation. Jidoka and implies intelligent workers 
and/or intelligent machines identifying errors and taking quick countermeasures. 
Heijunka: 
In a lean context heijunka means production leveling by transforming the typical 
peaks and valleys of eustorner demand into something flatter. That flatness, in turn, 
makes standardizing ofproduction proeesses easier. 
Mura: 
Mura means unevenness, irregularity, lack of uniformity, or inequality". It is a key concept in 
the Toyota Production System and is one of the three types ofwaste. 
Muri: 
The word means over burden or overwork. 
Muda: 
Muda is the Japanese word for, waste. Toyota has identified 8 major wastes that any company 
has. TPS is about eliminating these 8 wastes. 
Genchi gembutsu: 
Genchi genbutsu, means "go and see" in Japanese. It is a central tenet TPS or lean. The term 
refers to the idea that problems are best understood and solved where they occur - for 
example, on the factory floor. Rather than looking at information from a distance - in an 
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office, for example - regarding process issues, managers should go see for themselves what is 
happening and even get their hands dirty by doing the work themselves. 
Atokotei wa 0- kyakusama: 
This means the next process step is the customer 
Andon: 
Means "light" in Japanese. However, in a TPS environment, an andon is a visual control 
device in a work area, typically a lighted overhead display giving the current status (green, 
yellow, red) of each step in the production system. An operator experiencing a problem can at 
any time pull on the andon cord and alert team leaders and supervisors the problem. 
5S: 
5S is a housekeeping methodology for the shop floor. There are five rules ofhousekeeping for 
a lean environment and they help to expose waste and support the discipline needed to 
implement the Toyota Production System. The 5 S's are described below. 
l. Seiri (Organization): Keep just what is needed, clearly distinguish between what is needed 
and kept and what is unneeded and thrown away. 
2. Seiton (Orderliness): Have a place for everything and implement a system whereby 
everything is in its place. Organize in away that ensures that necessary things are kept close 
at hand. Tools and other objects should be easier to find and returned to their proper location. 
3. Seiso (Cleanliness): This can be viewed as systematic clearing where everything is 
cleaned, inspected and maintained on a regular basis. 
4. Seiketsu (Standardization): Establish methods within the company that will ensure the 
effective continuation of steps 1 thought 3. 
5. Shitsuke (Discipline): Set up systems that sustain the five Sprocess. Ensure that all 4 steps 
are maintained. 
Super market: 
The supermarket in lean is based on the function of the American super market system that 
Kiichiro Toyoda and Taiichi Ohno observed. In lean it is a tool of the pull system that helps 
116 
signal demand for the product. In a supermarket, a fixed amount of raw material, work in 
process, or finished material is kept as a buffer to schedule variability or an incapable process. 
A supermarket is typically located at the end of a production line. 
Just-in-time (JIT): 
A strategy that exposes waste, makes continuous improvement a reality, and relies on total 
employee involvement. It concentrates on delivering what the customer wants, when they 
want it, in the quantity they want. The key elements of JIT are flow, pull, standard work and 
takt time. 
Takt time: 
Takt is a German word that means rhythm or beat in reference to music. At Toyota Takt time 
is the name of the adjustable time unit used to synchronize the rate ofproduction with the rate 
ofdemand. 
IMVP: 
International Motor Vehicle Program 
MIT: 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
TPS: 
Toyota Production System 
TWI: 
Training Within Industry 
TMMK: 
Toyota Motor Manufacturing Kentucky 
SMED: 
Single minute exchange of dies 
ERP: 
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